

Chalmers M. Roberts

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# Helms, the Shah and the CIA

THERE IS A CERTAIN irony in the fact that Richard Helms will go to Iran as the American ambassador 20 years after the agency he now heads organized and directed the overthrow of the regime then in power in Teheran. The tale is worth recounting if only because of the changes in two decades which have affected the Central Intelligence Agency as well as American foreign policy.

Helms first went to work at the CIA in 1947 and he came up to his present post as director through what is generally called the "department of dirty tricks." However, there is nothing on the public record to show that he personally had a hand in the overthrow of the Communist backed and/or oriented regime of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953, an action that returned the Shah to his throne. One can only guess at the wry smile that must have come to the Shah's face when he first heard that President Nixon was proposing to send the CIA's top man to be the American envoy.

The Iranian affair, and a similar CIA action in Guatemala the following year, are looked upon by old hands at

and the country was thrown into crisis. Mossadegh "connived," as Wise and Ross put it, with Tudeh, Iran's Communist party, to bolster his hand. The British and Americans decided he had to go and picked Gen. Fazollah Zaneidi to replace him. The man who stage-managed the job on the spot was Kermit "Kim" Roosevelt (who also had a hand in some fancy goings-on in Egypt), grandson of F.D.R., and now a Washingtonian in private business.

Roosevelt managed to get to Teheran and set up underground headquarters. A chief aide was Brig. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, who, as head of the New Jersey state police, had become famous during the Lindbergh baby kidnapping case. Schwarzkopf had reorganized the Shah's police force and he and Roosevelt joined in the 1953 operation. The Shah dismissed Mossadegh and named Zahedi as Premier but Mossadegh arrested the officer who brought the bad news. The Teheran streets filled with rioters and a scared Shah fled first to Baghdad and then to Rome. Dulles flew to Rome to confer with him. Roosevelt ordered the Shah's backers into the streets, the leftists were arrested by the army and the Shah returned in triumph. Mossadegh went to jail. In time a new international oil consortium took over Anglo-Iranian which operates to this day, though the Shah has squeezed more and more revenue from the Westerners.

In his 1963 book, "The Craft of Intelligence," published after he left CIA, Dulles wrote that when in both Iran and Guatemala it "became clear" that a Communist state was in the making, "support from outside was given to loyal anti-Communist elements." In a 1965 NBC television documentary on "The Science of Spying" Dulles said: "The government of Mossadegh, if you recall history, was overthrown by the action of the Shah. Now, that we encouraged the Shah to take that action I will not deny." Miles Copeland, an ex-CIA operative in the Middle East, wrote in his book, "The Game of Nations," that the Iranian derring-do was called "Operation Ajax." He credited Roosevelt with "almost single-handedly" calling the "pro-Shah forces on to the streets of Teheran" and supervising "their riots so as to oust" Mossadegh.

TODAY THE IRAN to which Helms will go after he leaves the CIA is a stable, well armed and well oil-financed regime under the Shah's command which has mended its fences with Moscow without hurting its close relationship with Washington. The Shah has taken full advantage of the changes in East-West relations from the Cold War to today's new climate. While Iran and Guatemala were the high points of covert CIA Cold War ac-

tivity, there were plenty of other successful enterprises that fell short of changing government regimes. Today the CIA, humiliated by the 1961 Bay of Pigs fiasco it planned and ran, has withdrawn from such large scale affairs as Iran, save for its continuing major role in the no longer "secret war in Laos." The climate of today would not permit the United States to repeat the Iranian operation, or so one assumes with the reservation that President Nixon (who was Vice President at the time of Iran) loves surprises.

The climate of 1953, however, was very different and must be taken into account in any judgment. Moscow then was fishing in a great many troubled waters and among them was Iran. It was probably true, as Allen Dulles said on that 1965 TV show, that "at no time has the CIA engaged in any political activity or any intelligence that was not approved at the highest level." It was all part of a deadly "game of nations." Richard Bissell, who ran the U-2 program and the Bay of Pigs, was asked on that TV show about the morality of CIA activities. "I think," he replied, that "the morality of . . . shall we call it for short, cold war . . . is so infinitely easier than the morality of almost any kind of hot war that I never encountered this as a serious problem."

PERHAPS the philosophy of the Cold War years and the CIA role were best put by Dulles in a letter that he wrote me in 1961. Excerpts from his then forthcoming book had appeared in Harper's and I had suggested to him some further revelations he might include in the book. He wrote about additions he was making: "This includes more on Iran and Guatemala and the problems of policy in action when there begins to be evidence that a country is slipping and Communist take-over is threatened. We can't wait for an engraved invitation to come and give aid."

There is a story, too, that Winston Churchill was so pleased by the operation in Iran that he proffered the George Cross to Kim Roosevelt. But the CIA wouldn't let him accept the decoration. So Churchill commented to Roosevelt: "I would be proud to have served under you" in such an operation. That remark, Roosevelt is said to have replied, was better than the decoration.

Helms doubtless would be the last to say so out loud but I can imagine his reflecting that, if it hadn't been for what Dulles, Kim Roosevelt and the others did in 1953, he would not have the chance to present his credentials to a Shah still on the peacock throne in 1973.

1953: Teheran rioting that overthrew the government left the United States Point Four office with gaping holes for windows and doors.

the agency as high points of a sort in the Cold War years. David Wise and Thomas B. Ross have told the Iranian story in their book, "The Invisible Government," and the CIA boss at the time, Allen Dulles, conceded in public after he left the government that the United States had had a hand in what occurred.

IRAN IS NEXT DOOR to the Soviet Union. In 1951 Mossadegh, who confused Westerners with his habits of weeping in public and running government business from his bed, nationalized the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. and seized the Abadan refinery. The West boycotted Iranian oil

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# Study of corporate empires omits conquests

**INVISIBLE EMPIRES**, Multinational Companies and the Modern World, by Louis Turner. Harcourt Brace Janovich, New York, 1971. 228 pp.

By VICTOR PERLO

This book, written by a young Englishman, can be used as reference for some facts and partial histories about multinational corporations. There is even one more or less valid, broad generalization:

"We shall argue in this book that the typical transaction in international commerce is no longer simply exporting or importing. Instead, it is increasingly the creation of manufacturing facilities owned by multinational companies."

Turner visited the offices of International Business Machines and was given some interesting facts which he retails to his readers:

IBM operates in 104 countries, with over 500 sales offices and production facilities. All this is centrally coordinated through 307 communication centers, via some 10,000 teletype messages daily — letters are obsolete. Some 2,500 executives have desk-top microfilm readers to get instantaneously any piece of information they need. It employs 24,000 research and development personnel in 26 laboratories, seven of them in Europe. One might add — it wasn't true yet when Turner wrote — that IBM now makes more profits from its foreign operations than from its U.S. operations, and more from its foreign operations than any other U.S. corporation.

Turner points out that IBM, despite its "multinational" character, is solidly U.S. in ownership, control, and management. Only 1.6 percent of the executives are non-U.S. citizens, which means that in all the far-flung establishments of IBM, the local workers have U.S. bosses.

But there is nothing in this book about the driving force behind IBM and the other multinationals. There is no realization that this is the modern expression of the need of monopoly capital to expand anywhere and everywhere, and especially to derive super profits from foreign operations through payment of lower wages than in the home country and

through charging super monopoly prices after buying materials at prices below their value.

There is no examination, for example, of IBM's pricing policy, which in essence is to sell its products at about five times the factory cost of production! There is no mention of how "paternalistic," anti-union IBM engages in super exploitation of labor. Within the United States it signs contracts with service supply companies for laborers, cleaning per-

sonnel, etc., who are largely Black or members of other minority groups and get none of the benefits of IBM's "regular" employees. Outside the United States, it manufactures components in the U.S. puppet state of Taiwan, using workers paid one twentieth the U.S. scale.

Turner minimizes the importance and scale of international operations before World War II, and, in particular, omits the long-standing operations of the international oil trusts and cartels.

Incredibly, Turner doesn't even mention the multinational banks, which play a role in the international operations of monopoly capital quite comparable to their role within individual imperialist countries. Nor is there any systematic discussion — under any name — of the elaborate intertwining of imperialist government and private monopoly, of the manifold means of assistance derived from the home government by the multinationals in their drive to expand.

Turner notes the rapid growth of U.S.-owned multinational corporations in Europe since World War II. How did they get there? He attributes this to U.S. advantages in research, development and management. But he completely evades the main point:

The U.S. emerged unscathed and enriched from World War II, with an overwhelming advantage over its imperialist rivals in financial and material resources. Achieving military occupation and relatively permanent military bases in Western Europe, it imposed anti-Communist governments there. In effect, it made deals with the monopoly capital-  
the socialist revolutions that were inevitable at that time in a num-

ber of these countries if the internal forces were permitted to settle the issue without outside interference. This resulted in an open door for U.S. capital and for U.S. military power to ensure the retention of privileges of U.S.-owned corporations, among other purposes.

Without this, all of the alleged "managerial superiority" of the U.S. corporate brass would have counted for naught.

Turner does tell of the espionage operations of firms such as Imperial Chemical, Monsanto, du Pont; the relations of some U.S. monopolies to the Central Intelligence Agency, and connections with military intelligence and armed interventions. As an example, he cites the role of the United Fruit Co., the Dulles brothers and the CIA in the 1954 overthrow of the progressive Arbenz regime in Guatemala.

But all this is in the past, says Turner. Twenty years ago, at the time of U.S. interventions in Iran and Guatemala, the apologetic professors were referring to the supposedly extinct imperialism of Teddy Roosevelt and Calvin Coolidge. Now Turner simply updates the same transparent technique softened with sham naivete:

"This area is grossly understudied. The classic firms with intelligence links, like United Fruit, are relics of the bad old days of open dollar imperialism. We need to know more about how the manufacturing newcomers to the world scene are conducting themselves."

Come now, Mr. Turner. What about ITT and Chile? What about the warfare of the Seven Sisters of international oil against Iraq? What about Union Carbide and Rhodesia? What about the U.S. sugar trust and the Marines in Santo Domingo? And above all, what about that most fierce and on-going genocidal warfare of U.S. imperialism, on behalf of Standard Oil, Chase Manhattan and the Bank of America, Ford Motors and McDonnell Douglas —

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continued

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# The Central Intelligence Agency: A Short History to Mid-1963 — Pa

James Hepburn

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*"I never had any thought . . . when I set up the CIA, that it would be injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that I think we have experienced are in a part attributable to the fact that this quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its intended role . . ."*

— Harry Truman, President of the U.S.  
quoted at the start of the chapter

## Introductory Note by the Editor

The book "Farewell America", by James Hepburn, was published in 1960 in English by Frontiers Co. in Vaduz, Liechtenstein; 418 pages long, including 14 pages of index. James Hepburn is a pseudonym: the book is reputed to have been written by the French Intelligence, in order to report to Americans what actually happened in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. Copies of the book may be purchased readily in Canada, and at one or two addresses in the United States. No bookstore in the United States that I know of will order and sell copies of the book. (Inquire of the National Committee to Investigate Assassinations, 927 15th St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20005, for ways to purchase the book.) The twenty chapters are absorbingly interesting.

Information about secret intelligence services and the way they operate is of course not in the open literature. In the two and a half years since I read the book, I have seen no demonstration that any of the information contained in the book is false — and the information does tie in with much else that is known. Perhaps more than 90% of what is in the book is true.

The following article is based on Chapter 15, "Spies", of "Farewell America".

Everywhere — and the United States is no exception — there are criminals who will do anything for money. But it is one thing to murder a creditor, a Senator or a jealous husband, and quite another to assassinate the President of the United States.

### Hired Killers

Hired killers are rarely employed by a parapolitical or paramilitary group. They are much too dangerous. Their connections, their morals, and their insatiable avarice pose too many problems for a responsible organization. On the other hand, a number of individuals active in groups like the John Birch Society, the Patrick Henry Association, and the Christian Crusaders would be only too happy to volunteer for an ideological crime. But, although successful assassinations have on occasion been the work of fanatics, serious-minded conspirators would prefer not to rely on idealists. History tells us why.

### Fanatic Assassins

The Tsar's Prime Minister, Stolypin, was shot to death in 1911 during a performance of Rimsky-Korsakov's "Tsar Saltan" at the Kiev Opera.<sup>1</sup> The assassin, a lawyer named Dimitri Bogrov, was convinced he had acted in the cause of freedom, and many others before him had sacrificed themselves in the struggle against the Tsars. But fanatics like Bogrov who are prepared to die for a cause are few indeed, and the nihilists lost more men than the imperial families.

### Professional Soldier Assassins

Today, professional soldiers and guerilla warriors have taken up where the nihilists left off. They are just as courageous, but often less successful. In Germany, in 12 years of Nazism and 5 years of war, despite the Kreisau Circle and the numerous groups that claimed in 1946 to have belonged to the underground, despite the work of the Allied intelligence services and the plots hatched by several high-ranking officers of the Wehrmacht and the OKW, Hitler was never assassinated. Two officers, however, tried.

The first planted a bomb on one of Hitler's aides, claiming it was a bottle of cognac. The bomb was due to go off in the plane carrying the Fuehrer to the eastern front, but it failed to explode. The assassination attempt was never discovered. It was publicized later by its author, who meanwhile had recovered his "bottle of cognac".

### Colonel Von Stauffenberg Against Hitler

The second, more serious attempt was the work of Colonel Klaus Von Stauffenberg. His failure dealt a deathblow to the plot of July 20, 1944. Stauffenberg either didn't dare or didn't care to shoot Hitler.<sup>2</sup> Instead, he placed his briefcase, containing the equivalent of a pound of TNT<sup>3</sup>, under the conference table where Hitler was sitting and left the room, claiming he had to make a phone call. The TNT was set off by a detonator a few minutes later.

But Colonel Von Stauffenberg, while a brilliant cavalryman, was a poor saboteur. His bomb would have killed Hitler, and probably most of the other officers present, if the conference had been held, as was usually the case at Rastenburg, in the basement of a cement blockhouse. The closed quarters would have magnified the compression, and the explosion would have proved fatal. On that hot July day, however, the conference was held instead in a wooden barracks with the windows open. Hitler was only knocked to the floor and slightly wounded by the explosion.

Colonel Von Stauffenberg was mistaken in his choice of an explosive. TNT is excellent for blowing up railroad lines and bridges, but for this type of operation, a more powerful explosive was used a defensive grenade of the type used by the German

continued

# LIFE & LETTERS

## HEROIN AND THE CIA

by Flora Lewis

### THE POLITICS OF HEROIN IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA

by Alfred W. McCoy  
Harper & Row, \$10.95

One fact is beyond dispute: heroin is flooding into the United States in sufficient quantities to support an ever growing number of addicts. Estimates about the drug traffic are unreliable, but trends are painfully clear in mounting deaths, young zombies stumbling through city streets, crime to the point of civic terror. There are said to be some 560,000 addicts in America now, twice the number estimated two years ago and ten times the level of 1960.

Another fact goes unchallenged: suddenly, in 1970, high-grade pure white heroin, which Americans prefer to the less refined drug more normally consumed by Asians, appeared in plentiful and cheap supply wherever there were GI's in Vietnam. The epidemic was a vast eruption. It took the withdrawal of the troops to douse it, for the fearful flow could not be staunched.

Beyond those facts, the sordid story of drug trafficking has been a shadowy, elusive mixture of controversial elements. It was obvious that there must be corruption involved. It was obvious that there must be politics involved, if only because the traffic continues to flourish on such a scale despite the energetic pronouncements of powerful governments. It takes a map of the whole world to trace the drug net.

Since the United States suddenly

became aware of the sinister dimensions of the plague and President Nixon bravely declared war on drugs (unlike the persistently undeclared war in Indochina), it has been customary for U.S. officials to pinpoint the poppy fields of Turkey and the clandestine laboratories of Marseille as the source of most of the American curse. Nobody denied that the bulk of the world's illicit opium (some say 70 percent, some say 50 to 60 percent) is grown in Southeast Asia and particularly in the "golden triangle" of mountains where Burma, Thailand, and Laos meet. But the U.S. government insisted, and continues to insist in the 111-page report on the world opium trade published in August, that this supplies natives and seldom enters American veins.

Not so, says Alfred W. McCoy, who spent some two years studying the trade. And further, it is certain to become less and less so as measures which the United States demanded in Turkey and France take effect in blocking the old production and smuggling patterns. This is of crucial importance for two reasons. One is that firm establishment of an Asian pattern to America means that the crackdown in Turkey and France will be next to futile so far as availability of heroin in the United States is concerned. The second is that focusing attention on Southeast Asia would bring Americans to understand that the "war on drugs" is inextricably involved with the Indochina war, and has to be fought on the same battleground from which President Nixon

assured us he was disengaging "with honor."

McCoy, a twenty-seven-year-old Yale graduate student, worked with immense diligence and considerable courage—for the opium trade is dangerous business and the combination of opium, politics, and war can be murderous—to document the facts of the Asian pattern.

A good deal of it has been common gossip in tawdry bars of Saigon, Vientiane, and Bangkok for years. But the gossip mills of Indochina are a long way from the streets of Harlem and the high schools of Westchester County. The general knowledge that the rumors reflected is a long way from precise, confirmed detail. So the Asian pattern had never come through clearly in the United States.

Now, in his book *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, McCoy has set it down. To show how it developed, he had to backtrack. The use of opiates in the United States has a long history. It wasn't until after World War I that widespread opprobrium, added to growing understanding of the dangers, turned the trade into an underworld monopoly. But World War II disrupted the supply routes. Unable to get drugs, American addicts were forced to quit the hard way. The market diminished, and, with a modicum of enforcement effort and international cooperation, might have been wiped out.

A single U.S. official act, McCoy believes, turned that chance around and enabled the creation of a worldwide octopus of evil almost beyond

# Spock's Radicalism Brings Him Inner Peace

By Donald Piarré  
of The Journal Staff

The radicalization of Dr. Spock may have started in a tent in Connecticut where he slept summer and winter as a child.

Pitching a tent on the porch and sending the children there regardless of weather was the family way of instilling rugged self-reliance. Just as shutting a child in a closet was the way of punishing and instructing a disobedient boy.

"All my life my problem has been to satisfy a very harsh and rigid conscience my mother gave me," Spock said in an interview here last week.

## In Harmony Now

"Even during the years when I had written a very successful book and was a professor of medicine, my conscience still wasn't satisfied."

It was never satisfied, in fact, until in his 60s he began to believe what most radicals believe in their teens and early 20s — that the US government is the chattel and instrument of a ruling class of monied industrialists.

Now that he's crossed the "barrier" of reverence for the capitalistic system, he and his inner voice are in harmony at last, and the voice that formerly hectoring him now cheers him on.

Benjamin McLane Spock was born at New Haven in 1903 to a family he now says was "comfortable" and which some have called wealthy.

## No Money Shortage

He said that in four years at Yale he didn't hear a single speech, lecture or argument to challenge the prevailing Republican conservatism of the place.

When he was a senior his father drove him to the polls to cast his first vote. The elder Spock, general counsel of the New Haven Railroad, advised his son that Calvin Coolidge would make the greatest president in the history of the United States, and "Ben" cast a straight Republican ticket.

Three years later he married Jane Cheney, daughter of a

prosperous textile mill owner, and, with support from both families the couple moved to New York, the future Dr. Spock having transferred from

*The People's Party has opened a headquarters here at 150 E. Junoon Ave.*

Yale's medical school to Columbia's.

Their wedding gifts were worth about \$8,000, according to Spock's biographer, Lynn Z. Bloom, and they took their wedding trip in a car driven by the Cheney chauffeur.

Jane was a Bryn Mawr girl and a Socialist and many of Spock's fellow students were Socialists or Democrats.

"I was astounded," he said, "that a university educated person could be a Democrat, let alone a Socialist."

The general counsel of the New Haven Railroad had taught that Republicans created the wealth and Democrats devised schemes to deplete it. The son of the general counsel now fell into a long period of political ambivalence, which wasn't really settled by his voting for Al Smith in 1928.

"I argued with people for five years," he said, as often as not taking one side in the daytime and the other at night. He said he never understood this until he underwent psychoanalysis as a trainee in psychiatry. Then his mentor told him he was always arguing

politics because he wasn't convinced of anything.

He chose pediatrics over child psychiatry, he said, because as a trainee he never felt the solid satisfaction of seeing an unhappy person made happy by his psychotherapy. He also felt his psychiatric training would prove useful, would illuminate his pediatrics; and so it did, he said.

His political identity clarified in the Roosevelt era and he said he would still be a liberal if not for the Vietnam War. But there

was nothing inevitable about his further leftward progress, he said. It was fortuitous at several turns.

He joined the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE) in 1952, he said, for a single motive: to work for a nuclear test ban treaty.

As a pediatrician he was convinced that further atmospheric testing would bring infant deaths from cancer and leukemia, and increased birth defects.

He said he reached that conviction on the basis of scientific evidence, but reluctantly.

After 18 months the people at SANE elevated him to vice chairman. As the world's most famous pediatrician and as official spokesman of SANE he was often required to answer reporters' questions, and in formulating his answers he studied matters he had previously evaded.

"I was timid and evasive before," he said. "I didn't dare look at the record of my government."

Even as he looked, Vietnam began glaring back at him.

One result was that he appeared on radio and television for President Johnson, urging Americans to vote for "the peace candidate" over Goldwater, "the war candidate."

Two days after the election of 1964, Spock said, Johnson called him up.

"'Oh, Dr. Spock,' he said to me, 'oh, I hope I prove worthy of your trust.' And I was so embarrassed to have the president of the US talking that way that I said, 'Mr. President, I know you are worthy of my trust.' And three months later he started bombing North Vietnam."

Spock said that if his life had a turning point this "betrayal" by President Johnson was it.

## Hand in Glove Operation

He says he quadrupled his work for peace. He signed a "Call to Resist Illegitimate Authority" in the summer of 1967, joined the National Conference for a New Politics and attended its first convention in

the fall, and began to see that "for over a hundred years the United States had been taking advantage of weaker governments."

Then he discerned a connection between foreign adventures and domestic economics.

"Government and industry are hand in glove," he said, "not as part of a plot, but they're just natural partners."

"So when the United Fruit Co. comes to Eisenhower and asks for help against a socialist government (in Guatemala), he has no feeling of revulsion or horror about this, he sends down the CIA, because he knows these United Fruit people are some of the finest people in Boston, so OK, OK."

Industry pays the campaign bills that keep the politicians in office, he said, and industry owns the government. He said he didn't oppose wealth merely because it was unfair to the poor but because people who owned the government used it for their own private purposes.

So he now favors an income ceiling of \$50,000 a year and ownership of industry by the people of the area in which a factory is located. Workers, consumers, area residents and government officials would sit on the boards.

As presidential candidate of the People's Party, he repeatedly says there's no difference between the Democrats and Republicans, a dictum he and his party share with George Wallace and the American Party.

In this view McGovern is a mere tinkerer and Nixon is just the other half of the "McGovern-Nixon ticket." What's needed is fundamental change to abolish the kind of wealth that owns not only property but power.

When a girl at Alverno College asked him how much he made, Spock said about \$120,000 a year.

"Well, there," said she.

"Oh no," the doctor retorted, "they tax me to about 50 or 60 thousand, you see, so I know a family can get along on 50 thousand. I myself find it quite adequate."

It's so adequate he lives on a yacht in the Virgin Islands, has a New York apartment and pays his own campaign expenses, besides contributing a share of the People's Party

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continued

## Jack Anderson

### Guerrilla Movement

COMMUNIST guerrillas are operating across Latin American borders with increasing boldness.

For instance, two Guatemalan guerrillas, known by the underground names of "Tomas" and "Raul," are reported to have delivered Cuban financial aid to the Nicaraguan Sandinista movement in Managua.

✓ Huberto Alvarado Arellano, a Guatemalan Communist leader, has been quoted by the CIA, meanwhile, as stating that "the Latin American parties are very much interested in settling their differences with the Cubans, since it appears that the Cuban Communist Party is finally lining up with the Soviets."

Both Soviet and Cuban funds are now used to finance subversion in Latin America.

### Big Power Plays

A FEW weeks ago, the prime ministers of India and Pakistan sat down at a conference table and reached an agreement that could bring peace between these neighbors who have fought each other three times in the last quarter century.

Their latest war threatened to engulf the world in a larger, more terrible conflict.

A U.S. naval task force, headed by the nuclear carrier Enterprise, was detached from the Seventh Fleet and ordered to the Bay of Bengal as a "show of force." The task force had contingency plans for a Dominican Republic-style invasion.

The plans were disguised, as was the Dominican landing, as an "evacuation." All the while, the White House insisted America was remaining neutral.

In the meantime, the Chinese moved troops near the Indian border, and Pakistan's President Yahya Khan was quoted by the CIA as saying he had assurances the Chinese were ready to invade India.

The Russians promised India that any Chinese attack would be countered with a Soviet thrust against remote Sinkiang province, the Chinese nuclear and rocket test area. The Russians also assured India they would use their naval forces in the Bay of Bengal to block any hostile action by the U.S. task force.

In the end, a wider conflict was avoided, not by the diplomacy or good intentions of the great powers, but by the collapse of the Pakistan army in the east.

It was a shabby chapter in the history of big-power politics. It was an even worse blot on the record of the United States, which lectures the rest of the world on democracy but supported the Pakistani military dictator.

It is interesting to note that the agreement reached at the recent summit conference between Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Pakistani President Ali Bhutto, was the result of their own efforts. They decided that the best interests of their two nations lay in peace.

It was not the result of diplomacy by the United States, or Russia, or China. It was the result of the great powers at last, minding their own business.

# Changes Mellow Top

STATINTL

By Georgie Anne Geyer  
Service of the Chicago Daily News

## Banana Image

La Lima, Honduras—It was one of the most-despotic companies of its time, overthrowing governments when it pleased, bribing officials who were all too happy to be bribed, and turning its own name into a common noun that meant "Yanqui imperialism."

But anyone who doubts that old dogs can't learn new tricks should look at United Fruit's 100-million-dollar investment in Honduras today.

It may well be the most socially conscious American company in the hemisphere. Its workers are the highest paid in Honduras (\$4.50 a day) and their housing, health care and education are free and excellent.

It is the company union now, not the company, which is fighting government intrusion into their social paradise—such as attempts to take over the fine company hospital.

And it is the 14,000-employee union which is against the company's "progressive" plan to buy from local farmers so it can free itself of the political onus of owning too much land in a foreign country. Honduran farmers do not treat their employees as well as United Fruit, the workers insist vehemently.

Moreover, the company—now known as United Brands Company—is under a U.S. antitrust order to divest itself of one of its holdings in Honduras, Guatemala, Panama, or Costa Rica—but none of the countries will allow it to leave.

There should be a moral to the story, but where? For in the last 10 years, the company's share of the banana market has dropped from 60 per cent to 40. Earnings have not been high, largely because their costs are higher than those of new native producers in Ecuador.

"We are paying \$2 in social benefits for every dollar earned," said Houston H. Lacombe, the manager, a pleasant, serious man, commented recently, sitting in his simple frame office in La Lima. His grin was half a grimace. "That's our problem."

It may be their financial problem, but it is also their social pride, for as American companies go today, that old "devil" United Fruit—blasphemed from

a hundred election platforms, bitterly rhymed about by Latin poets, the "shark" or the "green prison" or the "octopus" of Latin leftists—has become an example for other companies.

Lacombe said, "We're completely out of politics. We realize we have to work with whatever party is in power. We get along very well with the government, as long as we keep our nose clean." He smiled. "We have no political opinions."

Oscar Gale, 52, director of the company union, wandered in. A husky, curly-haired man wearing a green guayabera shirt, he obviously felt completely at home with Lacombe.

He should feel at home. His big 2-story brick union building is by far the fanciest building in La Lima, and he travels abroad (to labor conferences) more than most company executives do. George Meany calls him "Brother Oscar."

"In 1923," the union man said, "Gen. Tiburcio Carrillas told the company that if they gave him 6 million lempiras, he'd resolve the strike that year."

Lacombe and another company official, Robert Turnbull, looked for just a moment vaguely uncomfortable. "Not only that, but he promised to eliminate all the attempts at organizing a union."

"It was just after the Russian revolution, remember. And, sure enough, when he became president he took Honduras out of the international labor organizations."

Things began to change in 1954 when a new union, formed in response to the social measures agreed to by the hemispheric countries in the 1948 Act of Bogota, staged a monumental strike of 60 days. The workers got a raise of 35 per cent.

"But the real change came in 1959," Gale went on. "One day the director of the company called me and said, 'This time, don't call the journalists. Let's go to the negotiating table.' Before we had always had an intense campaign in the press. Before going to the company, I'd go to the press."

"Now we have very good relations with the company," he summed up. "We resolve our problems directly on the negotiating table. This year we got the 7th-day wage, which doesn't even exist under Honduran law."

"We offered it before they asked for it," Turnbull said, smiling.

To see the United Fruit "town" at La Lima and the surrounding area is to see half a picture of the past and half a picture of the future. In the midst of hot, wild, semi-tropical country, La Lima is a Yanqui-with-lawnmower oasis of large wooden houses, huge overhanging trees, two clubs with swimming pools (one for workers), a nursery, 41 Latin schools and two English schools.

When workers' or employees' children finish the seven grades available here, they can get money from the company to study in the United States. Many do.

Next to new La Lima stands old La Lima, a collection of Wild West bars, pastel-colored wood storefronts and narrow winding streets. And about seven miles away is booming San Pedro Sula, Honduras's main industrial city which has boomed largely because of the company's policy of buying locally.

In contrast to the other half-awake towns in Central America, San Pedro goes every hour of the day and night and probably has more Latinos with big bellies, low-slung belts and Texas-style hats than any other few square miles south of Texas.

And out in the hot green countryside, among the sea of green banana trees, are the attractive little clusters of wooden houses around soccer courts where many of the workers live.

What was it that "reformed" United Fruit?

Largely it was the change in the times. When the company started in the early years of the century, it operated the same way to operate. But in the late '40s and early '50s, Latin Americans awakened to social change.

Unions were formed and social legislation began in most countries.

Many of United Fruit's executives realized, though not before they had done irreparable harm in maintaining dictators and supporting the CIA plot in Guatemala in 1954, that it was the end of an era.

But eventually it not only ceased most political intrigue, it began to diversify. In Honduras it embarked upon a little era of reform. In 1952 it decided to help its long-time Honduran administrative employees own their own land and buy the bananas from them.

"We thought it would be better politics to let the nationals own their own land," Lacombe said. So they helped employees called the Associated Producers buy 7,000 acres by loaning them the money and then deducting

10 cents a box of bananas until the loans were paid.

The union and the workers heartily disagreed with this. "What happens," Gale said, "is that the individuals don't work their own farms. They spend the money earned in other businesses. Many left them to their wives. And the workers were lower paid and had none of the social benefits of the company."

"It's funny," another official of the company said. "These men worked with the company and they know the business. But when they got their own land, they kept cutting back—not

enough fertilizer, planting too much. We wanted to do something for the people."

Today the banana business is not exactly booming. United Fruit shipped 31 million boxes of bananas from its 21,000 acres last year, but the price was down so much that the profit margin was slight.

The company is still suffering from a disastrous hurricane that destroyed thousands of trees a few years ago and it is suffering from the new Ecuadorian producers who entered the market and paid subsistence wages and no social benefits.

# Guatemala terror spurs world meet

By NAOMI CHESMAN  
North American Secretary of the  
World Federation of Democratic  
Youth, Member of Central Com-  
mittee of the Young Workers

## Liberation League

BUDAPEST, April 1 - (By air-  
mail)—An international youth  
meeting in solidarity with youth  
in Guatemala struggling against  
the dictatorship of Arana Osorio,  
the crimes of the guerrillas in  
Guatemala, and the crimes com-  
mitted by the CIA against the  
Guatemalan people, will be held  
April 26-29.

The meeting is part of the world  
wide Youth Accuses Imperialism  
campaign of the World Federa-  
tion of Democratic Youth and the  
International Union of Students.

It is also sponsored by the Stu-  
dent Federation of Central Ame-  
rica (FEUCA) and the Student  
Federation of Costa Rica (FEU-  
CR).

Participants from youth and stu-  
dent organizations of the Central  
American countries of El Salva-  
dor, Honduras, Nicaragua, Pana-  
ma, Mexico and Costa Rica as  
well as Guatemala are expected  
to attend.

The appeal adopted by the four  
sponsoring organizations states:

"The Guatemalan people have  
fought many years against exploi-  
tation, impoverishment, and  
against the delivery of the riches  
and national sovereignty to the  
imperialist interests.

"In the last five years there has  
been an intensification of the vio-  
lence and official terror against  
the people, leaving more than  
9,000 workers, farmers, students  
and professionals dead.

"Hundreds of Guatemalans fill  
the jails of the oppressive regime,  
suffer tortures, and inhumane pri-  
son conditions. Many 'disappear'  
without any official explanation.  
Urgent solidarity with the politi-  
cal prisoners and trade unionists  
is needed along with the fight for  
their freedom.

"The organizers of this meet-  
ing appeal to and invite the work-  
ers, farmers, intellectuals, artists  
and people in general to support  
this event, contributing to its suc-  
cessful realization."

# The big ones, like ITT, fly flags of many nations

STATINTL

By a staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

See the great tanker gliding majestically into harbor.

It is one fifth of a mile long. It was built in Japan for a German syndicate and brings Middle East oil to a New Jersey refinery on long-term lease to a Dutch oil company, flying a Panamanian flag. The master is a Swede, it is manned by a Hong Kong crew — a short-term operation financed by New York banks and insured by Lloyds of London.

What nationality is this?

It symbolizes the new 'multi-national, multi-billion dollar corporate world suddenly illuminated like unfamiliar objects in a room where somebody has struck a match — the accidental misadventures of the huge ITT.

ITT has been growing and expanding, for years, a conglomerate with 70 companies, operating in 50 countries, with about 30 percent of its income from abroad. Amid the 20 biggest industrial corporations in the world, ITT ranks 13. General Motors ranks first.

## The measure of concentration

A congressional estimate is that the 300 world's largest corporations now produce one-sixth of the earth's total industrial output and that by the year 2000 they will produce one-half. How long this process of concentration will go on and where it will end, nobody knows.

These big corporations often have their own foreign policies aided and abetted by the chancelleries of their respective governments whose duty it is, in part, to promote their health and welfare.

Take General Motors, the granddaddy of them all. Senate committees now plan to investigate the unknown feudal world of international conglomerates.

Private studies already exist. A study by Richard J. Barber, "The American Corporation," notes that GM, with 1,300,000 stockholders, employs 750,000 foreign and U.S. workers, with 45 plants in 24 countries. Its

total cash wages are more than twice the personal income of Ireland.

Is it a corporation or an independent power?

The giant ITT is charged on the basis of alleged memos coming into the possession of columnist Jack Anderson with collaborating with the CIA to block the coming to power of President Salvador Allende of Chile in 1970. U.S. Ambassador Edward M. Korry "finally received a message from the State Department giving him the green light to move in the name of President Nixon," according to one document; this allegedly representing "maximum authority to do all possible — short of a Dominican-type action — to keep Allende from taking power."

No official here will do other than deny the charge, which is creating a sensation in Latin America.

The Senate Foreign Relations committee is making plans to examine the matter. But whatever the validity of this particular allegation, there is a widespread belief that these huge commercial empires are a new factor in world affairs. They have an interest, in less-advanced nations, to reach an accommodation with the powers that be and, after reaching such an arrangement, trying to maintain the status quo.

This, it is argued, explains why around the world, the United States Government often seems to be trying to prop up a junta, strong man, or dictator, protecting its national interests against an insurrection from below often instituted by radical reform groups.

## Business side noted

At the same time, supporters of the big companies would argue that they have helped raise standards of living in developing nations—and that in richer countries they have provided employment and generated business.

Europeans have also noted the internationalization of business, because they are often the target for U.S. penetration.

"The third industrial power, after the United States and the Soviet Union, could easily be in 15 years not Europe, but American industry in Europe," wrote Jacques Servan-Schreiber in his book "The American Challenge."

Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (D) of Connecticut, chairman of a subcommittee on interna-

tional trade, puts combined sales of multinational corporations of \$300 billion. "It is absolutely essential to know more about this new phenomenon," he says.

ITT is 13th among the world's giants. Its president gets a salary three times Mr. Nixon's. Although ITT's interests run from the Sheraton Corporation and Continental Baking to the Hartford Fire Insurance Company, it does a majority of its business outside the U.S.

## \$12 billion in 1969

In 1969 American companies spent an estimated \$12 billion on new plant and equipment in foreign countries, so much that American organized labor looked at it jealously and charged it with exporting jobs.

• Ford at present makes 40 percent of its cars outside the U.S., Chrysler 30 percent, GM 25 percent.

• On the average, America's world companies are five times larger than the leading British and German corporations and 10 times larger than the French.

• Another item: There are 1,600 U.S.-owned companies in England, which account for 10 percent of the country's industrial output.

## New to man in the street

Business writers watch these trends with awe but till the ITT affair the man in the street paid little heed:

"What is taking shape, slowly and tentatively but nevertheless unmistakably," said Fortune magazine editorially, "is 'one world' of business, a world in which business will truly know no frontiers. . . ."

Inevitably foreign policy marches in step with business. The two are intertwined. American oil firms have an enormous stake in the Middle East. America's tax and oil import quotas are based upon international realities.

Studies of the CIA argue that it played a major part in events abroad; for example the overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh in Iran in 1953, and again in the overthrow of the left of center Arbenz regime in Guatemala in 1954.

Charges like these are so common that they are widely rumored and believed after many crises as, for example, the latest charge about ITT in Chile.

# A Short History of CIA Intervention in Sixteen Foreign Countries

In July, 1947, Congress passed one of the most significant pieces of legislation in the history of America in peacetime. The National Security Act of 1947 created The National Security Council, the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the United States Air Force and, not least of all, the CIA. This act provided the Agency with five principal duties:

1. To advise the National Security Council on matters concerning intelligence.
2. To make recommendations for the coordination of such intelligence matters.
3. To correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to national security and disseminate it to other government departments.
4. To perform "such additional services of common concern as the National Security Council determines can be more efficiently accomplished centrally."
5. To perform "such other functions and duties as the NSC would direct."

In 1949 Congress passed the Central Intelligence Agency Act, allowing the agency to disregard laws that required disclosure of information concerning the organization, to expend funds without regard to laws and regulations governing expenditures with no other accounting than the Director's vouchers, and to make contracts and purchases without advertising.

With such unprecedented authority, with unlimited access to money, with liberty to act without regard to scrutiny or review by either civilian or governmental organizations, the CIA has become a self-contained state. One observer ranks the CIA as the fourth world power, after the U.S., Russia, and China.

Partly because of the CIA's special "secret" status and partly because of the laziness of the press, the total history of CIA intervention in foreign countries has never been reported. What you read instead are fragments—an attempted bribe in Mexico last July, an assassination in Africa last November.

What emerges here is an atlas of intrigue but not a grand design; on the contrary, the CIA's record is as erratic and contradictory as that of any bureaucracy in the Federal stable. But you do begin to comprehend the enormous size of the CIA and its ruthless behavior. The rules permit murder, defoliation and drug addiction for political ends. Look at the record:



Graham Greene

# CHILE: THE DANGEROUS EDGE

Threatened by foreign aggression and domestic homicide STATINTL



AT THE NEXT Presidential election," I began in questioning Radomiro Tomic, the leader of the Christian Democrats at the last election in Chile.

"If there is another election," he corrected me.

It was not the first time I had heard that "if"—an "if" not reflecting the intentions of the governing coalition, the Popular Unity, who are trusted to follow the path of legality even to a bitter end. That "if" is the dark side of their courage. A man going up alone against a strong point, grenade in hand, might say to himself, "If I arrive living at that next belt of trees..."

A GOVERNMENT THAT HAS DONE so much with a minority of seats in Congress—nationalizing the copper mines without compensation, taking control of the principal banks by the purchase of shares, expropriating land far in excess of the timid measures of the Frei government—must wonder sometimes where, when, and how the counterattack is likely to fall. Will it take the form of an economic blockade by the United States or a disguised attack engineered by the CIA with the help of the Right extremists who murdered General Schneider, the head of the army? (One of those believed to be implicated still sits in the Senate, thanks to the slanted legalism of the Supreme Court.) Bolivia has had its right-wing coup—with the help of Brazil and the probable connivance of the United States; and an unsuccessful attempt was made last October to overthrow General Lanusse, the liberalizing President of Argentina, while preparations were in hand for his meeting at the Chilean port of Antofagasta with President Salvador Allende. If the plot had succeeded, two out of the three land frontiers of Chile would have become vulnerable. The Andes are no more a barrier than the Him-

alayas have proved to be to the Chinese. The boundaries of this strange, narrow, elongated country, extending from the tropical desert in the north to the Antarctic south, are never further from the sea than London is from Newcastle.

No wonder that the recent appointment of Nathaniel Davis—former American ambassador to Guatemala, the happy hunting ground of the CIA—as ambassador to Chile is felt as a hardly veiled menace. There is a sense of danger in the air: the strange thing is that a visitor is hardly aware of it for the first week or two. "I am told by everyone," I remarked with some flippancy to one of Mr. Tomic's followers, "that there is a lot of tension. But do you feel tension when you wake up in the morning?"

"Every morning," the stout, cheerful sociologist replied, without ceasing to smile.

The sense of tension is conveyed by the billboards that scream in scarlet letters for justice for the murderers of General Schneider, and by the newspapers. The constant war of attrition between the political parties is oddly diluted by the complete freedom of the press: *El Siglo*, the Communist paper, and *La Nación*, the government paper, daily denouncing *El Mercurio* of the Right, the property of the rich Edwardes family; while *La Prensa* sighs after what it considers were the good days of President Frei. The war against the *Mercurio* is even carried on to the bumpers of cars, with stickers that say, "*Mercurio* lies." There are certainly plenty of lies bandied about in the papers of the Right. (Unfortunately the *Mercurio* is the best produced paper, with the greatest coverage of foreign news, so that it is read even by the supporters of *El Siglo*.) The

Graham Greene's most recent book is the autobiographical *A Sort of Life*. Among his many widely read books are *Travel with My Aunt*, *The Power and the Glory*, *The Third Man*, and *Our Man in Havana*.

UPI dispatch, falsely datelined Bogotá, reported that one of Dr. Allende's planes, which crashed in the Colombian forest on its return flight from an official visit, carried arms for the guerrillas. This lie was serious enough to cause a temporary closing of the UPI agency in Santiago.

Even an unimportant visitor found himself touched by this spirit of malicious invention. The day after my arrival one popular paper of the Right stated that, in receiving me, President Allende had been tricked into receiving an impostor, traveling under my name. The sense of my own reality wavered a little when I heard the story, for there does really exist one such impostor on whom I have accumulated a large dossier (his most spectacular exploits were to be imprisoned in my name in Assam and blackmailed in Paris).

At first it is not the tension of which one is aware so much as the loaded plates in the big hotels, the well-dressed crowds, the windows full of consumer goods. At lunch with Dr. Allende I asked whether to increase the standard of living of the poor it might be necessary to start rationing food and goods. He said he hoped not. The Minister of Economics took the point up. He said my parallel with Cuba was not a good one—Chile had industries while Cuba had none, and there was no blockade. "For the time being," the President said.

IN SANTIAGO SMALL STORMS blow up and subside again. The noise of shouting one morning brought me down into the central square. There was a demonstration with much noise and many banners outside La Moneda, the governmental palace, but it proved to be only the long-standing quarrel about television channels. The President had refused to extend the area of Channel 13, because of the University, over the whole country. Just as the

continued

STATINTL

LAWTON, OKLA.  
PRESS

M - 12,119

OCT 22 1971

## Don't Fight Reds

The St. Louis Globe-Democrat had a cartoon the other day showing two high ranking officers in a Pentagon car. One was saying to the other; "Soon as we fight Communists, we're unpopular."

What is upsetting about the cartoon is the truth in it. That is not to say that Communists are under every bed. They aren't.

That isn't to say, the communists have taken over the White House, the Senate, the House, the Supreme Court. They haven't. But they are around.

They have the second largest industrial production in the world in the USSR. They did take over Cuba. They just took over Chile.

They are the Number One Power in Asia—Red China fears.

They would take over the world—surly no one can contradict this statement—they would take over the world if we were not strong enough to stop them . . . As we stopped them in Berlin with the airlift; as we stopped them in Korea; as we are now stopping them in South Vietnam; as our supplies helped stop them in India; as our CIA stopped them in Guatemala; as our supplies helped stop them when Israel defeated the Arab nations supplied by the USSR. . .

Just because there are not communists under every bed does not mean there are not communists. There are.

Yet, so very many well-meaning, intelligent, educated able Americans are convinced that there is no communist threat to freedom on earth. How sad, and how dangerous it is to hold these views.

STATINTL



BRIDGEPORT, CONN.  
TELEGRAM

M - 12,425

OCT 18 1971

## Pentagon's Plea

A nationally circulated cartoon the other day showing two high ranking officers in a Pentagon car. One was saying to the other: "Soon as we fight communists, we're unpopular."

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Just because there are not Communists under every bed does not mean there are not Communists. There are.

Yet, so very many well-meaning, intelligent, educated able Americans are convinced that there is no communist threat to freedom on earth.

# Guatemala: Where Violence Rules

By Victor Perera

Mr. Perera, a novelist, is at work on a book set in Guatemala, where he was born.

I flew south to Guatemala from Mexico City during a thermal inversion; a blanket of thick, brownish smog stayed beneath us until we neared the border, when it thinned to a pencil line that gave way, as we landed in Guatemala City, to the pure translucent sunlight I had taken for granted as a child.

After a 12-year absence, I was to fall in love again with my native country, only to discover that I had become its unwitting enemy.

Everywhere I looked—on the overpasses, outside banks, government buildings, foreign embassies—were angel-faced young soldiers and policemen with submachine guns on their hips. Radio patrol vans with wire cages—called *perversas*, or dogcatchers—cruised up and down the city in pairs, as did army trucks crammed with olive-drab soldiers armed to the teeth.

## Curfew May Be Resumed

Guatemala has been under a "state of siege" and virtual martial law since last Nov. 13, four months after President Carlos Arana Osorio took office. Until mid-February, a 9 p. m. to 5 a. m. curfew [later 11 to 5] was in force, and it could be restored at any time.

In the first 12 weeks after Nov. 13, at least 1,600 persons were arrested without formal charges or arraignments, and 750 to 1,000 more—among them a dozen prominent Guatemalans—were assassinated by vigilante groups of the military and the police.

Urban guerrillas with Castroite or Maoist sympathies have accounted for 25 to 30 more assassinations, mostly of army and police officers and government informers.

Explanations of how the violence started ranged from "international Communism"—the official government view—to *mala sangre* [bad blood], accompanied by a stoic shrug and the implicit

suggestion that violence is traditional to Guatemala and always will be.

The first week I was there the newspapers reported an average of two assassinations a day, one in the morning editions, another in the afternoon.

It was said that vigilante groups were "purifying" the countryside and clearing the courts of their overloads.

On another level is the systematic, mutual slaughter of front-rank Guatemalans of all political persuasions. It has accelerated into an almost ritual carnage in which right and left cease to have any meaning.

## Fatalism Permeates All

Again and again, in trying to come to grips with the violence, one bumps up against Guatemalan fatalism. Chapin [i. e., native Guatemalan] fatalism is contagious, omnipresent and as rooted in the soul of its people as the volcanoes and canyons that scar and gorge the landscape.

Chapin fatalism is more than a mental outlook, it is a lifestyle, an obsession that makes the current wasp cynicism of the north seem lightweight and bloodless. It is there in the numbed, dry-eyed faces of families who have lost a loved one thru kidnapping or assassination and who obstinately refuse to notify the authorities because they fear one side as much as the other.

It is in the bemused smile of an opposition leader as he tells you that he knows he has been condemned to death.

One inevitable result of the violence is a cheapening of human values to a degree I was not aware of 12 years ago. It is hard to describe the chill one feels on hearing one's close relatives justify the brutal assassination of a distinguished law professor, a cripple, in his wheelchair because they believed him a Marxist or a "guerrilla brain" who was thereby reduced to some nonhuman abstraction.

One gropes for parallels: Greece since the colonels, Mexico in the '20s, Algeria prior to independence. None of them; measure up.

Guatemalan culture has been another of the casualties. Too many of its surviving intellectuals and artists are in jail or in voluntary exile. The 1967 Nobel Prize winner, Miguel Angel Asturias, whose books until recently sold here mainly in translation, has lived in Paris for many years.

One returns always to the violence. It is as if, to try another rough analogy, the CIA and FBI, in response to accelerated terrorist activities by the Weathermen and the Black Panthers, were secretly to enlist and equip the Klan and the John Birch Society, fill out their ranks with Green Berets and crack police units and loose them on the country, leaving 41,000 corpses in 12 weeks.

Among the dead from both sides over a two-year period would be George Meany and Cesar Chavez, J. Edgar Hoover and Richard Helms, James Reston, Richard Rovere, Ralph Nader, John Kenneth Galbraith and Herbert Marcuse, Ronald Reagan, Averell Harriman, Generals William Westmoreland and Earle Wheeler, Roy Wilkins, Senators J. William Fulbright and John Stennis, Abbie Hoffman and Tom Hayden and 3,000 to 4,000 other people from the whole spectrum of American public life.

## Continuing the Analogy

Among the hundreds kidnapped by the Left and held for ransom or exchange or simply to embarrass the government would be Chief Justice Warren Burger, Gerald Ford, Bebe Rebozo and Ronald Ziegler, Darryl Zanuck and Herman Kahn, Henry Cabot Lodge, David Kennedy, H. L. Hunt, Howard Hughes and the German and French ambassadors.

Stretch the analogy back to 1966 and the equivalent would be 240,000 United States citizens murdered, and a quarter of a million more in prison or enforced exile.

This is a rough idea of the scale of the civil war that has raged for five years in this picturesque, Tennessee-sized republic of five million.

Among the recent incidents, two that cannot be censored are the cowardly machine-gunning in his wheelchair on Jan. 13 of Adolfo Mijangos Lopez, a law professor and an elected deputy of the

continued

STATINTL

# On Instructions Of My Government

By Pierre Salinger.  
 408 pp. New York:  
 Doubleday & Co. \$6.95.

By FLETCHER KNEBEL

Pierre Salinger—who, as press secretary to President Kennedy played an inside observer's role in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis—has written a tense, inside-outside novel about a similar confrontation of great powers over an installation of missile launching pads in the symbolic year 1976.

This time, America's foe is Communist China, which tries to sneak ICBM's into a small South American nation aboard two whaling ships. This time, the Soviet Union emerges as our wary ally. This time, the pawn is fictional Santa Clara, an impoverished copper country that appears to lie near or within Peru or Chile.

Fletcher Knebel's books include "Vanished," and "Night of Camp David."

"... a downhill country. Its rivers, riches and revolutions all ran from the mountains to the sea." The world, of course, goes to the brink. Whether it plunges over or pulls up short in the twilight of holocaust should remain a question sealed in the covenant between reviewer and writer. If you like novels whose characters play out noble or repugnant public roles—without such common joys and tribulations as copulation, impacted wisdom teeth, children, parents, dead ignition switches or those spells of brooding over the infinite immensity of the universe and its specks of human energy—you'll salivate over this one.

The prose races, taut and lean, honed on journalism and critical dilemmas in high places. Suspense beckons as the clock strikes midnight and the plot deftly rounds sharp corners. Almost all systems go. Salinger's one leaky system involves a clutch of self-exiled Mafia godfathers, who become enmeshed in the

gears and who can be extricated only by last-second slayings.

Salinger is at his best when he takes us inside his outside novel. We may never see one of the heroes in bed with his wife's sister or fumbling for tranquilizers; we do see him hunched over the hot line to Moscow, clattering to crucial meetings in helicopters, grimly attentive to the electronic maps in the White House situation room, reacting to still more bad news on the security telephone-scramblers. The good, rich air of authenticity is unpoluted. Fleets sail on precise orders. Diplomats double-talk. Official statements thunder. Press secretaries lie by omission. Jumbo jets hurtle presidential candidates through the heavens. Politicians connive, cables and wires carry top secret traffic, and Latin guerrillas stalk stony mountain trails.

Salinger also has a worthy message: our policy in Latin America abets rather than thwarts Communist take-overs, because we spend our tax money to arm local oppressors instead of striving to ameliorate mass poverty in a climate of social justice. As examples of his thesis, we have Cuba and Guatemala. In Cuba, we supported a cynical, plundering Batista—and got a Communist Castro. As for Guatemala, the late Allen

Dulles boasted that his C.I.A. stage-managed a successful revolution there in 1954, unhorsing a leftist president and installing one amenable to the United States; later our puppet canceled the land reforms of his toppled predecessor and 1.5 million acres of newly distributed land were taken back from the peasants. Now gunmen of the right and left are murdering one another in Latin America's most terrifying political slaughter. Some success, C.I.A.

Salinger's novel has two counts against it. First, it seems largely a replay of the 1962 crisis, thus muting the element of surprise. Second is a matter of timing. Salinger gives us a death-lock encounter with Communist China at the very time we're experiencing a thaw. The book, of course, was written months before Mao Tse-tung mailed out his ping pong invitations. For that, perhaps, his friends can murmur only, "Unlucky Pierre."

A footnote on conflict of interest. Since I also commit political novels, my views on a rival should be weighed with caution, not to say suspicion. Blame it on the editors. If they ask General Motors to assess the new product line of Chrysler, should G.M. decline? Not if they offer G.M. \$125. Times are tough all over. □

STATINTL

DATE: 03/04/2001

STATINTL

6 JUN 1971

## Guatemala Looks Eastward For New Trading Partners

Mexico City (Reuters)—Guatemala, one of the most staunchly anti-Communist countries in Latin America, plans to send a trade mission to Eastern Europe.

A Foreign Minister report issued recently in Guatemala City expressed concern over the growing protectionist mood in the United States; the Central American Republic's major trading partner.

### Dispute With Neighbors

The report added that a dispute between Guatemala's two southern neighbors, Honduras and El Salvador, which has threatened the once-flourishing central American Common Market, made it essential to search for new export outlets.

A trade mission led by a Guatemalan diplomat and including private businessmen will therefore visit Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, and Romania. The report said members of the mission already are in Europe.

The decision to seek markets in Communist countries follows a similar move by Costa Rica, which has gone further and re-established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, a step that some reports say was frowned on by the United States.

### Overthrow Of Arbenz —

If the Guatemalan mission leads to a formal trade exchange with Eastern Europe, it will be the first such contact between Guatemala and the Communist world since President Jacobo Arbenz was overthrown in 1954 after buying arms from Czechoslovakia.

Right-wing opponents accused President Arbenz, who died last month in Mexico City of moving the country toward the Communist Bloc.

His overthrow in a military coup was sparked by an invasion from neighboring Honduras, which was widely believed at the time to have been financed and mounted by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

It is thought unlikely here that the Guatemalan trade mission is a prelude to diplomatic relations with the Eastern European countries or the Soviet Union. The Guatemalan foreign minister, Roberto Izaguen, said last year that no such move could be

### New Wave Of Violence

The present Guatemalan government of President Carlos Arana Osorio has been facing a "new wave of terrorist violence in recent months from left and right-wing extremists.

Mr. Arana was elected to the presidency last month after leading a successful military campaign against leftist guerrillas.

Reliable sources in Guatemala City said initial contacts between Guatemala and Communist officials began in Bonn about two years ago.

The then ambassador to West Germany had talks with his Romanian counterpart, as well as with Czechoslovakian and Polish trade officials, the sources said.

West Germany froze its diplomatic relations with Guatemala last April after the murder by left-wing terrorists of its ambassador, Count Karl Von Spreti, and asked for the withdrawal of the Guatemalan ambassador to Bonn.

men whose prime motivation in life is to serve the public interest. Such a man was Paul Lilley, investigative reporter for the Cleveland Press. Paul knew well the workings of government, and he had some definite ideas on how it should operate to serve the people. Nothing offended him more than incompetence, mediocrity, or dishonesty on the part of those who had been entrusted with public office. He exposed many examples of such conduct, and even at the time of his death, he was diligently pursuing several investigations.

But Paul was not content merely to root out the bad in our Government; he also offered strong and unflinching support to those programs he considered to be necessary and worthwhile. Among his many endeavors, he will be remembered as one of those integral to the effort to create an urban renewal program in Cleveland.

In order for democracy to work properly, there must always be a group of dedicated citizens willing to take on the burden of constantly probing, questioning, and studying the actions of their government. Paul Lilley so labored for the people of Cleveland, and he will be sorely missed by the community he served so well.

I would now like to commend to my colleagues the resolution of the City Council of Cleveland honoring the memory of Paul Lilley.

The resolution follows:

#### RESOLUTION OF CONDOLENCE

(By Mr. Garofoli)

Whereas, the sudden death of Paul E. Lilley has saddened and stunned the many persons of this community who knew him as an intense, probing reporter, quick with a question and quick with a quip; and

Whereas, this Council remembers Paul best for the 21 years he was at the Hall from 1944 to 1965 during which time he was named "the Councilman from Ward 34" who would seat himself at the committee table and furnish questions to be asked of the Administration, who would plead successfully for the construction of the "Lilley Ponds"—neighborhood walk to swimming pools and who would excuse a neophyte councilman's mistakes for the first two weeks of his term but no longer; and

Whereas, a hard working, tough, persistent reporter who was at the Hall long enough to know City government and City employees Paul would differentiate between the vast majority of dedicated public servants whom he praised and "the phoney's" whom he would reach out; and

Whereas, while there are many ways that the life of a person may be evaluated, the true measure of a man is the respect he earns from his fellowman and the esteem which his colleagues have for him and in his regard Paul E. Lilley was truly a giant among men; and

Whereas, Council which knew and respected him, desires to honor and record the memory of this truly outstanding reporter; now, therefore

Be it resolved, That Council honors the memory of Paul E. Lilley and expresses its deepest sympathy to his bereaved family, his colleagues on the Cleveland Press and the many persons who mourn his loss.

Be it further resolved, That the Clerk of Council be and she hereby is requested to transmit a copy of this resolution to Council President Anthony J. Garofoli for presentation to the decedent's family.

#### VIOLENCE AND DEATH IN GUATEMALA

HON. HERMAN BADILLO

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, May 27, 1971

Mr. BADILLO. Mr. Speaker, Latin American politics have frequently been stereotyped by kidnappings and assassinations and, during the past several years, we have witnessed the growth of urban terrorism. Open warfare has developed between elements of the political right and left and shootings and bombings have almost become commonplace.

Guerrilla activity has been a particularly violent form of urban insurgency since its inception in the cities of Guatemala. Although the government attempts to dismiss these murders and kidnappings as the acts of extremists, current information reveals that many of these incidents have the tacit support of governmental officials. Some of the victims have been prominent Guatemalans including law professors, congressmen, a labor leader, a wealthy industrialist, and a radio station owner. Although arrests have not been made—even though a state of siege exists in Guatemala—the terrorist acts have reportedly been committed by bands of vigilantes who apparently do not approve of opposition to the current regime, as the victims had all been critical of President Arana and his policies.

A number of Guatemalans report that many of the murders were directly committed by certain factions of the army, which controls all police activity under the state of siege. What is especially troublesome, Mr. Speaker, is the possible involvement of our Government in supporting these terrorist activities through military and police training activities. Under the U.S. public safety assistance program, almost 300 Guatemalan policemen have received American training and much of the equipment being used by the police and armed forces was either donated by or purchased from this country.

This very disturbing situation was recently examined in a very well-written and perceptive article by Mr. Norman Gall which appears in the May 20 edition of the New York Review of Books. In this timely and penetrating piece, Mr. Gall describes the gruesome murders and almost countless kidnappings which have occurred in Guatemala over the past 4 or 5 years and raises some serious questions as to the U.S. assistance activities. Both in his introductory essay and in a review of a recent study by Richard N. Adams, Mr. Gall discusses the motives behind the vigilantes' terrorist activities as well as the oppressive and static atmosphere which currently exists in this Central American nation.

Mr. Speaker, I believe we should be fully aware of these developments in Latin America, particularly as this country's assistance program may be being misused. I am sure our colleagues will find Mr. Gall's shocking but important report to be of great interest and I am

pleased to present it herewith for inclusion in the RECORD:

#### SLAUGHTER IN GUATEMALA

(By Norman Gall)

Crucifixion by Power: Essays on Guatemalan National Social Structure, 1944-1966, by Richard Newbold Adams. University of Texas, 533 pp., \$10.00.

One of the most gruesome slaughters of this century in Latin America has been taking place in Guatemala during the past four years, and it has increased radically in recent months. This nation of ancient Mayan highland culture and rain-soaked hills and savannas is suffering a reign of terror that has claimed several hundred lives in the past few months alone, and thousands since it began in 1967, with U.S. support, as a counterinsurgency operation to destroy a rapidly expanding guerrilla movement. Only rarely have the victims been members of the guerrilla bands, which are based primarily in the capital and in the dry, hungry hillbilly country of the Guatemalan Oriente. More often the victims have been peasants, students, university professors, journalists, union leaders, and congressional deputies, who have been killed for vaguely leftist political associations or because of personal grudges.

The case of Guatemala is only the most lurid example of the kind of paramilitary violence that emerged in Latin America during the late 1960s as a recurrent method of managing intractable social and political problems. It is also prevalent in Brazil and Santo Domingo, for example. In Guatemala only a part of the killing of dissidents has been done by the government's official forces. In 1967 more than twenty right-wing paramilitary terrorist groups went into action with weapons supplied to the Guatemalan army under the U.S. military aid program. The groups used names like the White Hand, the Purple Rose, the New Anti-Communist Organization, etc. They first circulated leaflets carrying the names and sometimes the photographs of their announced victims, whose corpses—and those of many others—were later found grotesquely mutilated: dead men with their eyes gouged out, their testicles in their mouths, without hands or tongues, and female cadavers with their breasts cut off.

In early 1967 a Guatemalan army source gave me an estimate of some 2,000 persons killed by vigilante groups in the Oriente, while other estimates for the 1967-68 period have run between 3,000 and 6,000. In May, 1967, Guatemala's Catholic bishops declared: "We cannot remain indifferent while entire towns are decimated, while each day leaves new widows and orphans who are victims of mysterious struggles and vendettas, while men are seized in their houses by unknown kidnappers and detained in unknown places or are vilely murdered, their bodies appearing later horribly disfigured and profaned." But the killing continues.

Since last July the President of Guatemala has been Col. Carlos Arana Osorio, the slow thinking, slow speaking former commander of the Zacapa army base in the guerrilla zone and executor of the counterinsurgency operations during the terror of 1967. "If you want to have a real understanding of the international communist conspiracy," Arana told me at that time, "you should read two books: *The View from the Fourth Floor* by Earl Smith (former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba) and the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*." In a subsequent interview the US military attaché in Guatemala City called Arana "the best officer they've got in this man's army. Indeed, he would be a credit to any army."

Footnotes at end of article.

STATINTL

27 MAY 1971

# Guatemala, Chronically Violent, Is Getting

## Worse

By ARNOLD R. ISAACS  
Sun Staff Correspondent

Guatemala City, Guatemala—With its soaring volcanic peaks, forested mountainsides and crystal-blue lakes, Guatemala is one of the Western Hemisphere's most beautiful countries. But its social, economic and political divisions are as deep and jagged as the mile-high valleys where most of its people live.

Political unrest has been chronic throughout Guatemala's history. In recent years, it has taken the form of a back-alley terrorist war between armed bands of revolutionary leftists and extreme rightists.

Recently, the level of violence has increased. Politically motivated murders have occurred so far this year at the rate of about two a day, despite the tough anti-terrorist policy proclaimed by President Carlos Arana Osorio, a former Army colonel elected last year on a conservative, law-and-order platform.

A state of siege imposed last November, suspending many constitutional rights, remains in effect. This means searches without warrants, arrests without charges and a form of press censorship that was severe in the early stages but is now rather mild.

Guatemalans have learned to live with "la violencia." The streets of the capital hum with activity; ordinary citizens who are not involved in political life are distressed but not terrified at the wave of killings.

It is impossible to tell how many of those who voted for Mr. Arana believing he would end the terrorism are disenchanted, but so far there is no evidence that his support has been seriously undermined.

The leftist revolutionaries seem as far as ever from being able to expand their movement to the point where they could really bid for power.

Nevertheless, in the view of many thoughtful Guatemalans, the quality of political life—and the possibility of peaceful social change in a deeply divided country—are gravely threatened by the violence.

The fear is growing that the counter-terrorists, who repre-

sent the most conservative forces in Guatemalan life and who are at least partly shielded, it seems sure, by high military and police officials, will begin more and more to combat not only their leftist counterparts but all who challenge the government.

One of the victims in the latest wave of killings was Adolfo Mijangos, a Christian Democratic leader in the Chamber of Deputies. Other opposition political figures have been threatened.

"I'm afraid there will be no legal opposition left by the next election," a lawyer commented.

Another Guatemalan economist who describes himself as a political centrist, said: "As far as the left goes, I'm reactionary. But if I said publicly what I think, there are people here who would call me a Communist, and that sort of rumor can cost you your life."

"If the government acted as energetically against the right-wing groups as against the left-wing groups, perhaps it would be over. But where this will end, I don't know—nobody knows."

For every politically conscious Guatemalan who feels this way, of course, there is probably another who believes that any measures against the Marxist terror squads are justified.

In murders like that of Mr. Mijangos, or those of the United States ambassador, John Gordon Mein, in 1968 or the West German ambassador, Karl von Spreti, last year, the political motivations are apparent.

But most of the victims are more obscure, and so are their political connections.

A typical report in a Guatemala City newspaper last week described the death of a farmer named Jesus Gomez Garcia, in the town of Coatepeque. A band of armed men dragged him from his house, demanding: "Where are the arms?" When he denied knowing anything about arms, they shot him with submachine guns.

Who was Jesus Gomez Garcia and why was he killed? He could have been a conspirator on one side, slain by the other. He could have been shot as a suspected informer or betrayer. He could have been involved in a personal quarrel with a

terrorist leader. No one knows, but such accounts appear in the press every day.

A small, powerful class of landowners, businessmen and industrialists, mostly of pure or nearly pure European descent, has dominated political life for generations. Its influence has kept taxes down—Guatemala's rates are among the lowest in Latin America—and has preserved a social structure in the rural areas that remains something close to feudalism.

The middle and working classes, particularly in the cities and towns, are made up of Spanish-Indian "mestizos" and Indians who have assimilated Western ways and the Spanish language, known here as "ladinos."

These two groups have shared the satisfactory if not spectacular economic progress Guatemala has recorded in recent years, particularly since the formation of the Central American Common Market a decade ago.

But the unassimilated Indians, most of them living in the rural highlands, have shared far less. They account for half the country's estimated 5 million inhabitants. Few know Spanish; fewer are able to read or write. Almost all live in desperate poverty, without political or economic power.

Few governments in Guatemalan history had tried to undertake substantial reforms until the administration of Juan Jose Arevalo, from 1945 to 1950, began to organize the peasants and campaign for better labor laws, literacy and community development.

Mr. Arevalo's successor, Jacobo Arbenz, continued these efforts. But he was accused by anti-Communist critics of being a fellow-traveler, and the United States government agreed. In 1954, he was overthrown by a CIA-sponsored revolt that installed the conservative Carlos Castillo Armas.

A succession of conservative dictators followed until 1966, when the centrist Revolutionary party came to power in the first post-Arbenz free elections.

However, President Julie Cesar Mendez Montenegro was hemmed in between the leftist guerrillas and the traditional himself paralyzed. He was forced to rescind a mild tax in-

crease and wound up with survival his only goal—which he attained, passing his mandate on to President Arana last July 1.

Meanwhile, the rural guerrilla movement, centered in the Zacapa region east of Guatemala City, had been largely destroyed in 1937.

Mr. Arana, then an Army colonel, commanded the Zacapa garrison, and it was in that campaign that he earned the reputation for toughness on which he campaigned for the presidency.

One of his techniques in Zacapa was to arm civilian irregulars, who doubtless contributed to the smashing of the guerrillas but were also accused of much needless butchery.

The guerrillas infiltrated back into the towns and shifted to hit-and-run terror tactics. Counter-terror squads soon sprang up, some civilian and some apparently made up of policemen and soldiers.

During 1968, 1969, and 1970, 20 to 30 political murders a month were recorded. An upsurge last November—which led Mr. Arana to impose the state of siege that is still in effect—doubled the rate of killings.

There are two leftist terror groups, both using the initials FAR. One, the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (Rebel Armed Forces) has been responsible for the most spectacular incidents, including the killings of the two ambassadors.

The other, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (Revolutionary Armed Forces), is affiliated with the orthodox Guatemalan Communist party and has attacked policemen and soldiers almost exclusively.

The right-wing groups receive less notice, since the government usually blames one FAR or the other for virtually all political crimes. The Guatemalan press, subject to penalties if it challenges the official line too sharply, barely mentions the rightist bands.

## Slaughter in Guatemala

Crucifixion by Power:

Essays on Guatemalan National

Social Structure, 1944-1966

by Richard Newbold Adams.

University of Texas, 533 pp., \$10.00

Norman Gall

One of the most gruesome slaughters of this century in Latin America has been taking place in Guatemala during the past four years, and it has increased radically in recent months. This nation of ancient Mayan highland culture and rain-soaked hills and savannas is suffering a reign of terror that has claimed several hundred lives in the past few months alone, and thousands since it began in 1967, with US support, as a counterinsurgency operation to destroy a rapidly expanding guerrilla movement. Only rarely have the victims been members of the guerrilla bands, which are based primarily in the capital and in the dry, hungry hillbilly country of the Guatemalan Oriente. More often the victims have been peasants, students, university professors, journalists, union leaders, and congressional deputies, who have been killed for vaguely leftist political associations or because of personal grudges.

The case of Guatemala is only the most lurid example of the kind of paramilitary violence that emerged in Latin America during the late 1960s as a recurrent method of managing intractable social and political problems. It is also prevalent in Brazil and Santo Domingo, for example. In Guatemala only a part of the killing of dissidents has been done by the government's official forces. In 1967 more than twenty right-wing paramilitary terrorist groups went into action with weapons supplied to the Guatemalan army under the US military aid program. The groups used names like the White Hand, the Purple Rose, the New Anti-Communist Organization, etc. They first circulated leaflets carrying the names and sometimes the photographs of their announced victims, whose corpses—and those of many others—were later found grotesquely mutilated: dead men with their eyes gouged out, their testicles in their mouths, without hands or tongues, and female cadavers with their breasts cut off.

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Arana has been advised by US army officers returned from Vietnam who spent much of 1966 and 1967 in the Guatemalan Oriente ostensibly organizing "civic action" projects of social assistance to *campesinos*. During the terror Arana undertook a highly successful campaign of making secret contact with guerrilla collaborators, offering them amnesty in exchange for information and active participation in the vigilante groups. Soon former guerrillas donned black hoods and boarded trains and busses with army patrols to point out other members of the guerrilla organization. The most famous guerrilla collaborator who switched sides was a young Zacapa landowner, Oliverio Casteñeda, who, with support from Arana, became the leader of the

White Hand and of a private army of between 200 and 400 men who use Casteñeda's farm as their headquarters.

Arana remained in command of the counterinsurgency operations in the Oriente until two spectacular crimes were committed by the vigilante groups. In January, 1968, the naked and severely mutilated corpse of Miss Guatemala of 1963, a student named Rogelia Cruz Martinez who was a known guerrilla sympathizer, was found on a bridge near the town of Esquintla. She had been raped by several men. Two months later the White Hand shocked the country by kidnapping the Archbishop of Guatemala. These crimes led to the ouster, under pressure from the US Embassy, of the defense minister and the national police chief. Arana was appointed ambassador to Nicaragua, where Dictator Anastasio Somoza, Jr., had been protecting and supporting the operations of Guatemalan right-wing organizations.

The terror in Guatemala, while barbaric in some of its manifestations, is the product of a sophisticated political strategy. At the height of the 1967 terror I spoke with Mario Sandoval Alarcón, one of the organizers of the CIA sponsored invasion of Guatemala in 1954, later private secretary to President Carlos Castillo Armas until Castillo's assassination in 1957, and since then secretary-general of the extreme right-wing *Movimiento de Liberación Nacional* (MLN). In 1966 and 1967 Sandoval had raised large sums from wealthy planters and merchants to combat the guerrillas.

"We of the *Liberación* were the vanguard group that got this started," he told me in an almost inaudible whisper; he has a throat tumor that has increasingly impaired his speech in recent years. "The army was demoralized by the guerrillas last year until we organized the White Hand. When our actions began in the guerrilla zone the army found itself with peasants willing to serve as guides, militiamen, and *comisionados militares* [military constables]. In the systematic elimination of the guerrillas a series of injustices apparently have been committed. Several hundred persons have been killed, but between January and March [1967] the guerrillas have almost been completely eliminated from the Guate-

DECLASSIFIED  
CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY  
14 MAY 1971

STATINTL

Your World

# Is This the Same CIA?

By GARY McEOIN

For the first time in at least 10 years, the head of the CIA has spoken publicly about his work. His reason, he explained, was to counter the "persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency."



I must say I was amazed to learn that such criticism exists. Perhaps the CIA has means of access to domestic public opinion which I lack. But in my constant investigation of the issues raised by the existence and activities of the CIA, this one has never appeared even marginally.

On the contrary, the type of agency which Richard McGarrah Helms described in his talk would be hard to criticize. It has "no police, subpoena or enforcement powers." All it does is to collect facts about situations around the world that may affect the national security of the United States

and to project "likely developments from the facts."

But there it stops, according to Helms. "We not only have no stake in policy debates, but we cannot and must not take sides," he said. "The role of intelligence in policy formulation is limited to providing facts. . . . Our role extends to the estimate function. . . . but not to advocacy."

Apparently Helms has neglected to read President Eisenhower's memoirs, a grave oversight for a collector of facts. In "Mandate for Change" Eisenhower describes in detail the role of Allen Dulles, Helms' predecessor as head of the CIA, in the invasion of Guatemala in 1964 and the overthrow of that country's constitutional government by a mercenary army financed and outfitted by the CIA and private United States interests.

**THE INVASION** was at the point of failure when the invaders lost their air force in combat. Eisenhower in Washington reviewed the crisis with Henry Holland of the State Department and Allen Dulles. Holland, who in Eisenhower's own words was "the real expert in Latin American affairs," warned of the appalling harm the United States would suffer in Latin American and world opinion if we intervened officially. But Dulles fought him and persuaded Eisenhower to overrule him. The planes were replaced and the Guatemala government was overthrown.

Helms has also disclaimed any infiltration of the academic community. Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish political scientist and economist, expresses in his latest book ("The Challenge of World Poverty") his grave concern at "the prostitution of U.S. academic life" through the financing of re-

search on Latin American problems by the CIA and other government agencies. Latin America's intellectuals fully share Myrdal's evaluation.

Eisenhower's account of his second administration ("Waging Peace") also places the CIA in a role far more extensive than the collection and projection of facts. He provides data which can be collated with information from other sources to establish the leading part played by the CIA in organizing and equipping the force assembled in Central America in 1960 to invade Cuba.

A public official engaged in espionage might possibly defend the morality of deceiving an enemy. I do not see, however, any possible moral—or even political—justification for treating the American public as the enemy to be deceived. Yet such a practice seems to have become a recognized and widely accepted part of our institutions.

The CIA is not an insignificant detail of government. Its annual budget, for which the director does not have to account, is in excess of \$3 billion. The size of its staff is classified but it reportedly more than 20,000. Employees are exempt from civil service procedures. The agency makes and enforces its own rules for hiring, investigation and firing. And, as transpired in 1969 when it refused to allow its members to testify at a court-martial of Green Berets charged with murder, it is not even answerable to the nation's judicial system.

National security considerations may justify such exceptional procedures. But they must not be expanded to the point where they erode the bases of our system of law and justice.

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3544

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE

May 5, 1971

HEW PEACE ACTIVITIES

April 17 (Wed.) Indochinese film festival  
First of three weekly films to be shown each  
Wednesday 12 noon to 1:00 PM Room 1137-  
North Title: "And Time Is Running Out"  
(5 minutes). This film portrays the effects  
of the war on the Indochinese civilian popu-  
lation and presents the May Day Move-  
ment's demand: "If the Government won't  
stop the war—we'll stop the Government."

April 8 (Thurs.) Rennie Davis, National  
Coordinator of the People's Coalition for  
Peace and Justice 11:45 AM North Auditor-  
ium. He will speak on the spring anti-war  
activities and how HEW employees can be-  
come involved.

April 14 (Wed.) Indochinese film festival  
Film No. 2) Title: "People's War" Rm.  
37-North. This film shows the North Viet-  
namese people under war conditions (August  
69) organizing to defend their country.

April 15 (Thurs.) Vietnam veterans  
against the war (11:45 AM Room G-751  
North. Representatives of the estimated  
1000 Vietnam veterans who will be march-  
ing on Washington April 19-23 will speak  
out the war.

April 21-22 (Wed.-Thurs.) Referendum:  
the war in Indochina. All HEW employees  
will be asked to participate by voting on  
several national issues.

April 21 (Thurs.) Indochina 1971: How is  
the war different? 11:45 AM Rm G-751 North.  
Panel of Washington activists, including  
individuals who have recently met with Viet-  
namese and Laotians, will speak to the  
changing characteristics of the war.

April 24 (Sat.) Peace rally and march. The  
Federal employee's contingent will meet at  
1:30 AM in McPherson Square (15 & K  
Streets, N.W.).

April 28 (Wed.) Indochinese film festival  
Last of 3) 12 Noon to 1 PM Rm. 1137-North.  
Title: "Struggle for Life." This film  
has produced by the National Liberation  
Front (NLF) to show the struggle for libera-  
tion in South Vietnam and to show the  
health services provided by the NLF.

April 29 (Thurs.) People's lobby HEW  
will be the all-day focal point of the anti-  
war activities. Representatives from NWRO  
and SCLO will discuss the war and oppres-  
sion here at home with HEW employees at  
noon in the Auditorium.

Among the events listed on the sched-  
ule, you will note Rennie Davis, national  
Coordinator of the People's Coalition for  
Peace and Justice, speaking on April 8 in  
the North Auditorium regarding the  
Spring anti-war activities and how  
HEW employees can become involved.  
Representatives of the Vietnam Veterans  
against the War were to address em-  
ployees about the war on April 15 in the  
North Building. The Indochinese Film  
festival included three films; one por-  
traying the effects of the war on the Indo-  
chinese civilian population and present-  
ing the May Day Movement's demand:

If the Government won't stop the war—  
we'll stop the Government.

Another film, identified as being pro-  
duced by the National Liberation Front,  
showed the struggle for liberation in  
South Vietnam and health services pro-  
vided by the NLF. A third film, which I  
resume was also produced by the Na-  
tional Liberation Front, showed the  
North Vietnamese people under war con-  
ditions organizing to defend their coun-  
try.

These "peace activities" certainly were  
not designed to promote loyalty or har-  
mony within the Government, and I  
frankly am at a loss to understand why  
they were permitted to take place on  
Government property. I am sure there  
are those Government employees who  
have personal convictions against the war  
in Vietnam and would like to attend ac-  
tivities such as these. But it is totally in-  
comprehensible to me why the Depart-  
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare  
is accommodating these protest groups  
in presenting their message by making  
Government space available to them to  
show Communist-produced films and  
speak to Government employees about  
how they can actively work to halt the  
operations of the Government.

The American public has elected a  
President to direct our Government's op-  
erations and dictate our country's poli-  
cies. Although some Americans disagree  
with the policies of the administration,  
they undoubtedly expect the Government  
structure itself to remain loyal to the  
policies of the President. For the most  
part Americans accept the policies laid  
down and fully expect the employees of  
the Government itself to do so. Regard-  
less of the banner under which these ac-  
tivities are permitted—employee rela-  
tions, employee activities, or other—I see  
no reason why Government space should  
be allowed to be used to promote senti-  
ment against the Government's policies,  
particularly in a matter as serious as the  
Vietnam war.

How do I explain to my tax-paying  
constituents who have lost sons and hus-  
bands in this war that we are allowing  
facilities supported by their tax money to  
be used this way.

I have written to President Nixon and  
to Secretary Richardson expressing my  
concern over this action, seeking an an-  
swer to this question, and urging that  
this type of activity not occur again in  
Government buildings.

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order  
of the House, the gentleman from Maine  
(Mr. HATHAWAY) is recognized for 10  
minutes.

[Mr. HATHAWAY addressed the  
House. His remarks will appear hereafter  
in the Extensions of Remarks.]

U.S.S.R., U.S.A., AND THE PANAMA  
CANAL

The SPEAKER. Under a previous order  
of the House, the gentleman from Penn-  
sylvania (Mr. Flood) is recognized for  
15 minutes.

Mr. FLOOD. Mr. Speaker, in recent  
years various Members of the Congress  
in both Senate and House have warned  
of the long range Soviet program for  
wresting control of the Panama Canal  
from the United States. To meet this  
danger my distinguished colleague from  
Missouri (Mr. HALL) and I have intro-  
duced identical resolutions expressing  
the sense of the House of Representa-  
tives that the United States should main-  
tain its undiluted sovereignty and juris-  
diction over the Canal Zone and canal.

Many other Members of the House have  
joined us in this effort.

The fact that the time has come for the  
House to act on the indicated resolu-  
tions is evidenced by the publication in  
the September 1970 issue of the New  
Times of Moscow of a most revealing ar-  
ticle by Ruben Dario Souza, the General  
Secretary of the People's Party of Pan-  
ama, who visited the Soviet capital at  
that time. This Soviet support of Pan-  
amanian objectives is most significant.

In an article in a recent issue of East  
Europe, a distinguished international  
magazine published in New York, Joh  
P. Speller, its executive editor, quotes a  
major portion of the Dario Souza article,  
interprets its thrust as regards Soviet  
objectives at Panama, and urges a three  
point program to safeguard the vital in-  
terests of the United States. As stated  
by author, Speller, this program, which  
does not require new treaties with Pan-  
ama, consists of the following:

First, reaffirmation of U.S. sovereignty  
in perpetuity over the Canal Zone;

Second, increase of security precau-  
tions as regards the employment of aliens  
in security positions in the maintenance  
and operation of the canal; and

Third, the major modernization of the  
existing Panama Canal.

The previously mentioned resolutions  
to reaffirm U.S. sovereignty over the  
Canal Zone and canal, although intro-  
duced in the House, have not yet  
been acted upon. Proposed legislation for  
the major modernization of the canal  
has been introduced in both House and  
Senate but hearings have not been held.  
The question of the employment of  
aliens in Panama Canal security positions  
is of prime importance for such employ-  
ment could paralyze the operation of  
the canal in a time of crisis.

In regard to the last matter it was the  
holding by U.S. citizens of security posi-  
tions that enabled the canal to operate  
without interruption to transit during  
the January 1934 Panamanian mob as-  
sault on the Canal Zone, which fact  
won the admiration of the shipping  
world.

The recent visit of Robert B. Anderson  
to Panama in connection with a re-  
sumption of treaty negotiations em-  
phasizes the importance of prompt ac-  
tion by our Government in the premises.

As the indicated article is most timely  
and should be of high interest to all  
Members of the Congress and others  
concerned with canal problems, I quote  
it as part of my remarks:

[From the East Europe, Feb. 1971]

RUSSIA, AMERICA, AND THE PANAMA CANAL  
(By Jon P. Speller, Executive Editor of East  
Europe, has been interested in Panama  
Canal matters for more than a decade. For  
the past two years he has been working on  
a book, The Panama Canal: Heart of Amer-  
ica's Security, devoted to analysis support-  
ing the major modernization of the Pan-  
ama Canal proposed by Congressional  
Panama Canal experts Congressman Daniel  
Flood Dem., Pa.) and Senator Strom  
Thurmond (Rep., S.C.)

In recent years the Russians have vigor-  
ously entered into a race for naval supremacy  
over the United States. Except for the fact  
that they were foolish to throw down the

STATINTL

May 1971

STATINTL

# UNDECLARED U.S. WAR IN GUATEMALA

JUAN COBO

CROSSES, crosses, crosses. . . Painted white and placed in strict geometrical order, as at a military cemetery, they bear no names of the people in the graves beneath, no dates of birth and death. Only numbers. Buried at La Verbena cemetery in the environs of the Guatemalan capital, these people were never identified. All that is known about them is that they were victims of the vicious reign of terror that has long prevailed in Guatemala.

But at this cemetery rest the remains of only some of those done to death. There are also victims whose names are well known. We shall name just a few of them, killed in this year 1971. The peasant leader Tereso de Jesus Oliva, murdered by a tommy-gun burst as he was leaving church with his wife and child. Professor Adolfo Mijangos Lopez, a Christian Democrat member of Parliament who in a speech in the Chamber appealed to the government to condemn the violence and enter into a "civilized dialogue" with the opposition; he was shot in the back of the head in broad daylight in the heart of the capital. The leader of the Guatemalan Party of Labour, the Communist Professor Julio Camey Herrera. The trade union leader Jaime Monge Donis. The student leader Juan Luis Molina. And many, many more.

The Guatemalan press is forbidden to say anything about the murders of patriots, dissidents or simply "suspects" whose bodies are found nearly every day in maize plantations and roadside ditches, on deserted river banks and on the outskirts of big cities. The "big press" of the capitalist West, ordinarily so eager for sensations,

makes scant mention of these occurrences or else tries to put the blame for the situation on the Guatemalan Left. But even so, the truth about the reactionaries' reign of terror and its real sources penetrates to the outside world.

## What Señor Domingo Revealed

Early this February, a prominent member of the Guatemalan moderate opposition arrived in Washington. He asked to be called Señor Domingo, explaining:

"If my name is published I will be killed when I return to Guatemala. I do not expect to live until our next Presidential election, which is in 1974. But I do not want to commit suicide."

The visitor told newsmen that since the government of Colonel Carlos Arana Osorio had come to power last July, the terror had got worse than ever. Over 700 people had been killed.

The U.S. press introduced Señor Domingo as a man "well known in non-Communist Leftist circles outside Guatemala" and "respected even by State Department officials who are policy-bound to support the Arana government." The chief purpose of his trip was to persuade the U.S. authorities to stop supporting the present Guatemalan regime, or at least to condemn the terror it encouraged.

But he got a very cold reception. He was given to understand, said the *Nation*, that in the opinion of an influential group of State Department officials Arana was "carrying out messy but necessary housecleaning." As to the killing of members of the liberal opposition, the *Nation* gave Washington's position on that in these words: "That the victims include ostensibly respectable politicians is dismissed as an operational necessity."

This cynical reaction in official Washington was increased as Señor Domingo was imprudent enough to point out that the Guatemalan police received about \$2 million a year through the U.S. Agency for International Development. Six members of the Agency's mission in Guatemala were officially

listed as "public safety advisers" and openly instructed the police thugs. Furthermore, advisers from the Pentagon equipped and trained Arana's 12,000-strong army, which also took part in the killings, and the amount of U.S. expenditure on that was kept secret.

The Guatemalan opposition representative cited these facts in the hope that liberal Congressmen would secure an investigation into U.S. involvement in the events in Guatemala. But no such investigation followed. "Speaking most candidly," Señor Domingo was told by a State Department official, "there are a lot bigger problems in the world, and I simply do not see that much Congressional interest in Guatemala."

## Who Is Behind the Killers

The cold reception the Guatemalan opposition envoy got in U.S. official circles was not due to their having "bigger problems." For what is happening in Guatemala is in effect one of Washington's many undeclared wars. Señor Domingo's public statements only produced exasperation in the U.S. capital, for they reminded the world of that. We may mention here that Señor Domingo, who still had illusions about dollar "democracy," spoke of the U.S. presence in his country with considerable restraint. Georgiana Geyer of the *Chicago Daily News* had previously reported, for example, that there were over one thousand U.S. military and police instructors in Guatemala. And her Uruguayan colleague Eduardo Galeano had reached this conclusion: "The United States exercises parallel rule in Guatemala. This is clearly to be seen in the presidential palace, where to each Guatemalan there is at least one American, who is the one who in fact decides."

This "parallel rule" dates all the way back to 1954, when on Washington orders and with U.S. air support an army of CIA mercenaries invaded the country and overthrew the existing democratic government, which had tried to carry out a number of progressive reforms which affected U.S. Big Business interests.

20 April 1971

STATINTL

## The Honorable Men Of The CIA

Last week Richard Helms in his first public speech since his 1966 appointment as director of the Central Intelligence Agency tried to counter what he characterized as a "persistent and growing body of criticism which questions the need and the propriety for a democratic society to have a Central Intelligence Agency." He attributed the criticism to an "inherent American distaste for peacetime gathering of intelligence," and told his audience that the nation must "take it on faith that we too are honorable men devoted to her service."

If Mr. Helms's analysis of information gathered abroad is as incomplete and misleading as his interpretation of what prompts criticism of his agency here at home, then the country is clearly in trouble. It is not the intelligence gathering aspect of the CIA's operations that has fed the growing body of criticism. What the critics object to are covert paramilitary operations around the globe, and they question whether the secrecy that is admittedly required for some aspects of intelligence gathering should be extended to cover a host of questionable and frequently illegal activities under the pretext of serving an undefined "national interest."

In the years since it has become active in covert operations the CIA has financed the invasions of two countries, Cuba and Guatemala, and otherwise influenced the establishment and overthrow of governments in a number of lands, including Vietnam. It provided planes and mercenary pilots to the Congo (some of the same men it trained to invade Cuba) and for several years it has financed and directed a mercenary army in Laos in violation of our treaty commitments. At the same time it has engaged in activities that have more to do with propaganda than intelligence. It has subsidized magazines and publishing companies and the operation of radio

stations which free advertising in this country portrayed as supported by private donations.

In addition there have been instances in recent years when the agency has apparently been successful in establishing for itself a place above the law. Two examples are the dismissal of a slander suit against an agent on the ground that, even though his statements were not substantiated, he was acting under orders, and the case of the Green Berets accused by the Army of murdering a suspected Vietnamese double agent, but never brought to trial because the CIA refused to supply witnesses.

Even assuming that Mr. Helms is correct in his contention that the agency functions under the tight control of the President, an assumption which many knowledgeable critics dispute, the fact remains that the agency's activities have evaded the checks provided by the Constitution and in doing so it has deceived the American people. The issue, then, is not whether the men in charge of the CIA are devoted, or even honorable, and faith is not the answer to such fundamental criticism. It was faith in the efficacy of covert military and political manipulation, after all, that propelled us into our tragic involvement in Southeast Asia.

What is needed is a check on the presidential fascination with Mr. Helms's "Department of Dirty Tricks," a fascination that has pervaded the past four administrations. Congress is the appropriate body to provide that check, even though at present it is not doing so. The supervision now supplied by a handful of key members of Congress is, in the words of a recent Twentieth Century Fund study, "only sporadic and largely *ex post facto*." Fortunately there are efforts now underway to strengthen congressional overview of the CIA. These efforts deserve the support of the American people.

5 APR 1971

## Police Aid Presents Dilemma

U.S. Assists Guatemala  
In 'Pacification Program'

By Terri Shaw

Washington Post Staff Writer

## GUATEMALA CITY—

The United States is supplying extensive aid, in equipment and training, to Guatemala's police and armed forces.

This assistance is part of a U.S. policy of support for what the Guatemalan government calls its "pacification program."

The U.S. aid is controversial here, because many Guatemalans believe that at least some sectors of the police and military are responsible for much of the recent political violence, and that they have at least the tacit approval of the government.

Six prominent public figures—and dozens of lesser-known ones—have died violent deaths since the government of President Carlos Arana Osorio imposed a state of siege last November.

Most of the Guatemalans I interviewed during a one-week visit here—both supporters and opponents of the government—expressed the belief that the regime was directly or indirectly responsible for some of the political killings. Some defended the murders as a necessary means of stamping out leftist insurgency, while others criticized the government for imposing an "atmosphere of terror."

The government says that tough security measures are necessary to curb political violence from both left and right.

## Dilemma of U.S. Programs

This situation illustrates the dilemma of U.S. programs to aid the police and the military in countries where police operations are not merely a matter of routine public administration, but a major issue in internal politics.

Americans involved in the police and military assistance programs both here and in Washington have denied that the Guatemalan

police and military might commit abuses. However, they did deny that any U.S. personnel were involved in any such abuses and said that U.S. donations of money and equipment did not contribute to the abuses.

U.S. officials who were questioned about the aid programs said they were designed to "modernize" and "professionalize" the security forces, thus preventing misuse of police and military power.

The U.S. State Department's publicly distributed background notes on Guatemala state that one of Washington's "policy objectives" is "to support the constitutional government of President Arana in its efforts to eliminate insurgency and terrorism."

The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) says that one of the goals of its program in Guatemala is "to strengthen the government's ability to contain the security threat posed by a serious Communist insurgency movement."

While the U.S. military mission and police assistance program in Guatemala are small in comparison with those in some other countries, they have a considerable impact in a country only slightly larger than Tennessee.

## 20 Per Cent U.S.-Trained

For example, while the total manpower of the Guatemalan army, navy and air force probably does not exceed 10,000, more than 2,000 Guatemalan military men have been trained in the United States or in U.S. military installations in Panama since 1950.

Since AID began "public safety assistance" to Guatemala in 1957, almost 300 Guatemalan policemen have received training in the United States or Puerto Rico.

Twenty-five U.S. military men and seven former U.S. policemen, carrying sidearms, are assigned to Guatemalan bodyguards, are known to live and work in

Guatemala. Most of these men are Vietnam veterans. The number of other Americans who may be involved in covert work with the local military is not known.

While grants of military equipment have been suspended since the Cambodian invasion last spring, a large proportion of the Guatemalan armed forces' equipment was either donated by Washington or purchased from the United States.

Military mission members assist the Guatemalan air force in flying and maintaining its 45 airplanes, and advise the army on administration, intelligence, logistics, operations and its civic action program.

The head of the military mission, Col. Robert G. Mundinger, was born in Argentina and speaks fluent Spanish. As a member of the Office of Strategic Services, he worked with the French resistance during World War II and with anti-communist guerrillas in China after the war.

## Impact of Police Aid

While assistance to the police is conducted on a much smaller scale, it has also had an important impact on Guatemala.

When the Arana government took office last year, it asked for assistance in modernizing the 7,000-man police force. AID provided \$378,000 for the purchase of 85 vehicles, including "all purpose" pickup trucks, 25 Bronco jeeps and eight sedans for detectives. The grant also covered the purchase of 55 shotguns and plastic shields, tear gas and batons for riot control.

Last year the United States also gave Guatemala \$410,000 for the construction of a new police academy and a repair shop for police radios and vehicles.

In the past, AID has helped Guatemalan police improve their records system; set up a nationwide system; and convert to a modern, standardized fingerprint classification

system; establish a driver-training program for policemen, and equip a mobile crime laboratory and a photo lab.

Herbert Hardin, currently head of AID's Public Safety Assistance program in Guatemala, is a former Albuquerque, N.M., police administrator who has worked for AID in Washington and in Colombia, South America. He has a degree in criminology from the University of California at Berkeley.

## U.S. Called 'Accomplice'

One Guatemalan opposition leader deplored U.S. assistance to the police, saying, "The government of the United States, which knows that the police use these arms and training against the people, is an accomplice of a dictatorial government."

The politician, a respected and experienced leader of his party, asked that his name not be published, saying that he believed his name was on a list of persons marked for assassination.

University student leaders, who also asked that their names not be published, charged that Guatemala had become "a Latin American laboratory" for the Central Intelligence Agency and other "U.S. organizations advising the government."

The students said the United States was providing this assistance to protect U.S. investments. One defender of the program agreed with this point.

"Guatemala is two countries away from the United States," an American observer said. "The interest of the United States is to have some degree of peace and order, and the interest of the United States, of course, includes U.S. investment."

The same source added, "If we refuse to sell them arms, they will arm themselves, hopefully, with French, Spanish or Italian arms. They have armed themselves with Eastern European equipment."

continued

PLAYBOY  
1 April 1971

# THE DEATH OF LIBERALISM

*a radical journalist contends  
that the old-line liberals—  
obsessed with cold-war  
anti-communism, big  
government and unworkable  
social programs—have misled  
and misgoverned america*

opinion By JACK HENRIETTES

*He not busy being born is busy  
dying.*  
—BOB DYLAN

THE OLD LIBERALISM is busy dying. As a theory, as a tradition, as a set of institutions, as a group of leaders, liberal anti-communism has become a God that failed. Liberals such as Hubert Humphrey and Nelson Rockefeller have become part of the problem—worn-out fig leaves covering the naked emperor's private parts. The New Deal has become the status quo; the old solution has become the new problem.

Let me be precise about who the liberals and the liberal center are: I'm talking about the Peace Corps, the Alsop brothers, the A. D. A. (Americans for Democratic Action), Bayard Rustin, the A. F. L.-C. I. O., *The New York Times*. I'm also talking about the Ford Foundation, the Office of Economic Opportunity and the Ripon Society—all self-proclaimed pillars of liberalism. There is also the liberalism of those "tough-minded" professors such as McGeorge Bundy, Walt Rostow, John Roche and Henry Kissinger, which has become indistinguishable from the kill-ratio logic of the Defense Department computers that predicted the last Viet Cong guerrilla would die 20 months ago. The liberalism of respectable institutions such as *Commentary* magazine, Freedom House and New York's Liberal Party has become a barrier to social change, a dead hand on the present, preventing the liberation of new ideas, new programs, new movements, new myths. After zigzagging ambiguously through the Thirties and Forties, the American electoral left fell off the track entirely about 1950, and we are still paying the backbreaking price.

so many fine, formative hours. We are paying that price in a trade-union leadership that stands to the right of *The Wall Street Journal* and the Catholic Church on most public issues. (One cannot help but notice how much the C. I. O. deteriorated after it cleansed itself by purging Reds and radicals in the late Forties.) And we are paying that price in the unnatural isolation of the student, black and anti-war movements of the Sixties, which were forced to start from scratch, bereft of immediate historical fathers.

The crucial point is that during the Fifties, liberalism lost its will to fight and accepted the basic economic and foreign-policy assumptions of the right. And this pulled the center of gravity of American politics decisively away from the left. What has happened these past 20 years is not that the country has grown more conservative but that liberalism has grown more conservative. By failing to organize F. D. R.'s "one third of a nation ill-housed, ill-clad, ill-nourished," by remaining silent during Joe McCarthy's attack on the Bill of Rights and by getting us into Vietnam, liberalism did the work of the right while claiming to represent the left.

Now we must move beyond and transcend the Cold War liberalism of military intervention (Bay of Pigs, Dominican Republic, Vietnam) by becoming peaceful internationalists once again. And as historians such as Howard Zinn, Christopher Lasch and Staughton Lynd have pointed out, we must go back and rediscover the deeper roots of the indigenous American left in fragments of the Populist, feminist, black, Socialist and Progressive movements of the late 19th and early 20th Centuries.

No insurgent movement has ever succeeded that was rooted in hatred of its own country—a fatal mistake of which parts of the New Left (Weathermen, Yippies) are guilty. By retrieving the banner of the left as it was before it was corrupted by the Cold War, we offer the post-linear kids something inside their own nation with which to identify, so they won't have to import exotic fantasy notions of revolution from North Korea or Bolivia. By restoring the old dignity to the Populist attack on monopolies and abusive corporations and banks, we can take liberalism out of the soft suburban living rooms and place it on the side of the workingman—the unskilled factory worker, the waitress, the gas-station attendant, the dishwasher, the taxi driver, the small farmer. And by reconnecting with the old Populist passion for participation and decentralization, we can begin to end

that all human problems can be solved in Washington if you hire enough experts and bureaucrats and pay for enough Rand Corporation studies.

If something lasting went out of liberalism during the Fifties, then there had to be a deeper reason than just the Cold War, or McCarthyism, or that the unions purged all their rebels. That reason was that the central intellectual formulations of liberal anti-communism were mistaken. I don't say that the liberal leaders of the Fifties were badly motivated or uncommonly corrupt, or that any large numbers were caught in the web of conspiracy woven by the CIA spider. All I argue is that their judgment was bad, and their mistakes have had grievous historical consequences.

They were wrong, first, in their total, fanatical anti-communism, which permitted no possibility for change in the Soviet bloc and blinded them to terrible injustices within their own society and within the so-called Free World. Philosopher Sidney

Hook, the archetypal liberal anti-Communist, was able to write in the *Partisan Review* in 1952: "I cannot understand why American intellectuals should be apologetic about the fact they are limited in their effective historical choice between endorsing a system of total error and critically supporting our own imperfect democratic culture. . . ." That was never the stark either/or choice intellectuals faced. There were always the independent alternatives of democratic radicalism, or neutralism in the Cold War, or support for the great movements against colonialism then being spawned in the womb of the Third World from Cuba to Algeria to Vietnam—movements almost all the NATO intellectuals ignored in their elitist preoccupation with white Western Europe. And one does not make this case now with the cheap wisdom of hindsight. In fact, there were American intellectuals at the time—men such as C. Wright Mills, Dwight MacDonald, Paul Goodman and Norman Mailer—who did resist the tide of fashion and held onto a saving remnant of independent radicalism.

The second conceptual mistake the Fifties' liberals made was "the end of ideology" mischief, popularized by Daniel Bell's book bearing that unfortunate axiom. Bell's theory expressed the remarkable idea that all the great structural problems of America had been solved, and all that was required now were small adjustments, some minor technological tinkering with the soft machine at the

The foolishness of this notion has been proved many times by the mass

STATINTL

# Chilean Revolution: The Bullet or the Ballot

For the past several decades, Chile has been the only country in Latin America (Cuba excepted) in which the organized working class has been both politically and socially significant and also led by Marxian socialists.

WHEN ASKED BY A REPORTER what he thought the recent election of Marxist Salvador Allende meant, a Chilean peasant replied: "Now it's our turn."

That puts the issue nicely. Does the fact that Chile now has a freely elected President who won "without soft-peddalling the Marxist revolutionary program he hopes to carry out" (New York Times) really mean that at last it's the "turn" of the peasants and workers? The answer is not so simple as one might first expect.

Allende ran as the coalition candidate of the mass-based Communist and left-Socialist parties, the old Radical Party (whose only ideology is opportunism) and the independent Catholic revolutionaries (MAPU). He pledged to put Chile "on the road to socialism" by taking over the major domestic and U.S. corporations, the banks and insurance companies and large agrarian estates, and by instituting democratic planning in the interests of the nation as a whole. Thus, the question: Can the Chileans put through a socialist revolution via the historically unprecedented route of constitutional amendment, presidential leadership and parliamentary legislation, while the parties, the mass media and the unified organizations of the propertied classes still vie freely in the political arena, and the old Army (46,000 strong)

and crack police force, the *carabineros* (24,000), remain intact and untouched?

On the face of it the question seems extraordinarily silly, if not absurd, especially in a period in which the U.S. government has repeatedly intervened in the internal affairs of other countries to resist movements for national independence and social reform. Whether radical or reform governments were elected democratically or not has never mattered in the past, either to the local ruling class or the U.S. government. Time after time—in the Dominican Republic, in Brazil, in British Guyana and elsewhere—Washington and its ruling-class allies have opposed, undermined and subverted popularly based constitutional governments. In 1954 the CIA overthrew the constitutional reform government of Jacobo Arbenz in Guatemala and sponsored a dictatorship that returned expropriated properties to the United Fruit Company, repealed social reforms, gave oil concessions to American companies, smashed trade unions and killed hundreds—perhaps thousands—of workers and peasants.

In 1967 the reform government of the freely elected Greek Premier Andreas Papandreu, an anti-communist and Social Democrat, was overthrown by a combination of Greek and foreign investors in league with the Army. They destroyed parliamentary democracy as soon as it looked like

by Maurice Zeitlin

Photographs by Alejandro Stuart

16 March 1971

# CIA recruiting game

There was a time when the CIA could overthrow governments, finance military dictators and run airlines all in secret. When anyone made accusations against this venerable American institution everyone scoffed and carried on believing that it was a small intelligence agency similar to the one every nation maintains.

That was the way it was. Today it admits to having financed anti-government guerrilla troops in Laos, shady dealings in Cambodia, and its former members openly admit that the CIA did indeed overthrow the Jacobo Arbenz government in Guatemala and the Mossadegh government in Iran.

But the CIA is still at it. At the recent Seventh Congress of the International Organization of Journalists in Havana, Panamanian journalist Baltasar Aispurua told how he had been trained by the CIA to spy on the conference and report on Cuban and other socialist press agencies.

Aispurua's story reads like a perfect James Bond movie, with fat little bureaucrats and addresses in Mexico and Miami—except that it is true. Along with his presentation of the history of his CIA training, Aispurua showed the radio he was given to send messages to Mexico, a jacket with a false lining in which he was supposed to carry his coded reports.

According to Aispurua, he was first contacted by a CIA agent named Francisco Colon in December of 1968. Colon told him the CIA was interested in him because of his expertise on Cuban affairs. Aispurua was also told "we can solve any economic problem or any other kind of problem you may have."

When the agent returned three days later, Aispurua agreed to work with the CIA.

He was visited the next day by Colon, this time accompanied by "a Yankee" named Rojer, who took over from that point.

Rojer took him to a suite in the Las Vegas building, behind the Hotel Panama. Rojer and another American named Al interviewed him at length. Questions asked in the interview included, "What is your favorite color? What is your favorite form of entertainment? and What kind of women do you like? [Aispurua is married]. Would you like a house and a car and to be able to give good things to your children? What would you like to be? What are your philosophical beliefs on how to make the world a better place? and Can you adapt to living outside of your country?"

When contacted, Aispurua was underground as he had been involved in leftist activities on Panama before the October 1968 coup.

In January 1969, together with Al, Aispurua was introduced to an old man "apparently a Filipino, who was just introduced as Dr. Garay, who had just arrived from Washington. Garay was a fat man of medium height who

using a lie detector which Garay said had not failed in the 20 years he had been using it. Aispurua passed.

Before leaving Panama, he was trained in secret writing, receiving and decoding radio messages "which sent coded messages at a rate of 125 groups per second."

And of course what would the CIA be without an ousted Bucan bureaucrat? The classes were given by a man of 50 named Adolfo who had held a high-ranking post in the field of Cuba-U.S. shipping before fleeing the country in the wake of Batista's speedy withdrawal.

After training Aispurua was taken around the world apparently for a first hand look at the Spanish-speaking Who's Who in the CIA.

He was treated with special cordiality by the then director of Costa Rican immigration, who is now in the leadership of the right-wing Free Costa Rica Movement (MCRL). He then went to Colombia where Al gave him his superspy radio, the jacket containing the codes, the money for his trips, and the carbon paper on which he was to send his messages.

This was also the time when he was told what his objectives were on the Cuba mission.

He was he said to find out where the missile sites were (if any), check into the private lives of revolutionary leaders, discover any unreported economic reports on Cuba and try to make secret agreements with the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party.

From Colombia he went to Cuba, with stops in San Juan, Caracas, and Madrid on the way. He finally arrived in Cuba April 7, 1969, whereupon he immediately proceeded to spill the beans on the latest CIA attempt to find out what the people see in Fidel Castro.

Aispurua greeted his would-be victims with the statement, "I have come to Cuba, but I am an agent recruited by the CIA as part of its plans to obtain information for its eventual aggression against Cuba."

Aispurua began his presentation by explaining the element the CIA computers seemed to have omitted is that which lets a revolutionary stand by his cause even in the face of offers of money, a house or a car.

Said Aispurua, "My revolutionary ideas won out in order for me to be here today, on my own responsibility, but with the absolute satisfaction of having acted honestly, exposing how imperialism tries to buy hearts and minds and attack the Cuban revolution—and with it the Latin American revolution—and how imperialism underestimates those of us who devote our lives to the struggles of the people."

The addresses of the CIA he was given are Javier Suarez Lara, P.O. Box 27, 358 Mexico City, D.F. and Luis Valdes Garcia, 7840 S.W. 139th Terrace, Miami, Florida 33158.

MINNESOTA DAILY

4 March 1971

# ROTC as world tactical squad

by

Jim Gerharter and Mike Blaz

(First of two articles)

The presence of the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) on the University campus is a political, not an academic issue. The abolition of ROTC from the University campus is necessary not because ROTC maintains low academic standards, but because the policies it defends and the interests it serves are wrong. Reforms aimed at making ROTC more academically respectable are attempts to conceal the real issue. Third World people are not concerned whether or not it is a properly liberalized cadre which oppresses them; their concern is with the existence of their oppressor, and so our concern should be with ROTC's existence on campus.

The government's policy in Asia, Latin America and Africa has always been integrated with the interests of American corporations; that is, the war in Vietnam is not a "mistake," but part of a larger policy designed to preserve U.S. economic and political control over "underdeveloped" countries. The military, led into battle by ROTC graduates, protects corporate profits both home and abroad. What the National Guard and other forces of "order" do to black rebellions within this country, ROTC does to Third World people outside the country. The purpose is essentially the same, the target just happens to be further removed.

It is convenient to look at ROTC as a sort of world tactical squad, a cadre of officers trained at universities for the express purpose of insuring control over oppressed countries. ROTC graduates defend the national interest in Southeast Asia in the same manner as the military defends the national interest in the ghettos of this country, by crushing any outcry against racial oppression.

It is important to understand the necessity of ROTC to the military effort, because once this is established it becomes evident why ROTC must be abolished. ROTC recruits and trains junior officers for the U.S. military. It provides the officers to command the troops and therefore is not a mere symbol of the Vietnam war and its horrors, but one of the most vital elements of aggression on oppressed nations throughout the world. Fifty per cent of all Army officers currently on duty are ROTC graduates, 35 per cent of the Navy's and 30 per cent of the Air Force's.

According to the defense department, the number of new male officers sought in the fiscal year 1970 was 57,000. Of this number 23,700 were expected to come from ROTC and related college programs and about 20,300 from Officer Candidate School. With the winding down of the Vietnam war, ROTC now provides 83 per cent of the necessary input of junior officers. The other two ways of getting a commission are relatively nonproductive, with West Point producing only about 1,000 officers a year (at \$50,000 a head) and direct commissions which make up less than 3 per cent.

The figures presented here should be sufficient to refute the argument that ROTC is not an important source of junior-imperialists. A widespread anti-ROTC movement could dry up the only significant stable source of officers for the military. Col. Pell, ex-commander of the now defunct Harvard ROTC unit explains the significance of ROTC to the war effort: "Let it be understood beyond question that there is

28 FEB 1971

# Costa Rica 'Plot' Still Hurting U.S.

BY FRANCIS B. KENT  
Times Staff Writer

SAN JOSE, Costa Rica—Foreign agents, smuggled guns and the lightning coup are as commonplace as bananas in this part of the world. But not in Costa Rica. This peaceful little republic has long been known as the Switzerland of Central America.

Yet all these elements—and more—have surfaced here in the last few weeks, to the acute embarrassment of both the Costa Rican and U.S. governments.

The fallout to date includes the recall of a U.S. Embassy official generally identified as station chief for the Central Intelligence Agency here and the dismissal of the U.S. aid mission director.

## Plot Charged

Earl (Ted) Williamson, No. 2 man in the embassy's political section and, reputedly, the CIA's top official here, left San Jose last Sunday for Washington amid widespread charges of complicity in a plot to overthrow the government of President Jose Figueres. His withdrawal had been sought repeatedly by the Costa Rican government.

Although U.S. Ambassador Walter C. Ploeser and State Department officials in Washington vigorously deny the charges of U.S. involvement, there is much evidence to the contrary. Moreover, sources well up in the Figueres government expect to see Ploeser himself depart soon for another assignment.

## To Preserve Ties

Figueres, too, in an effort to preserve his long-standing friendship with the United States, has gone out of his way to demonstrate publicly that all is well between the two nations. He has praised Figueres' decision to renew diplomatic relations with

It is known, nonetheless, that:

—The Figueres government seriously feared an uprising in early January.

—The Guardia Civil, Costa Rica's only armed force, was alerted at that time and plans were made to remove Figueres from the capital to a hiding place in the mountains.

## Fall Predicted

—Williamson, a frequent critic of Figueres, had publicly forecast not long before that the Figueres government would not survive another two weeks.

U.S. and Costa Rican officials alike have expressed astonishment at the very idea of a U.S. intelligence agent conspiring to overthrow the government of a man who, over the years, has been among the warmest of Washington's friends in Latin America. Even so, in the light of circumstances, highly reliable sources have suggested that such a development is not altogether unlikely.

## Start of Trouble

Difficulties between the embassy here and the Figueres government date back to the president's inauguration last spring, following an overwhelming electoral victory over opposition on the far left and far right.

A charter member of Latin America's democratic left, Figueres had led an anti-Communist rebellion here in 1948, served as president from 1954 to 1958 and had lived and taught in the United States. He is known as an outspoken critic of Communist Cuba's Fidel Castro.

Still, there was friction from the start with the embassy. Williamson, who had served in pre-Castro Havana and married the niece of a wealthy sugar

criticism was echoed by his wife in social circles.

Figueres, for his part, said he was only following the lead of President Nixon, who had said it was time to end the era of confrontation and begin an era of negotiation.

## No Effort to Curb

Ploeser, a St. Louis banker and insurance man, a Republican congressman from 1941 to 1949 and an effective GOP fund-raiser, arrived here in April. He is said to have made no effort to curb Williamson's public outbursts against Figueres.

The situation came to a head just before Christmas, when Williamson observed at a cocktail party that Figueres' government would not last beyond two more weeks. In itself, the remark might have been overlooked, but there was more.

## Arms Movement

Simultaneously, a rumor swept through San Jose that arms had been landed clandestinely on the remote Peninsula de Osa in the southwest. Other weapons were reported to be moving across the border with Nicaragua.

Ploeser told reporters that there were "certainly no ships owned by any agency of the United States" in the Peninsula de Osa area. He said he had immediately offered to provide surface vessels and aircraft from U.S. bases in Panama to investigate the reports. It has been suggested officially that what was landed there might have been contraband whisky.

## No Question

There is no question, however, that arms did in fact cross the border from Nicaragua. These are described by sources close to Figueres as 101 semi-automatic weapons delivered at Figueres' request by the government of Panama. On Jan. 10, 1969, the Guardia Civil was

worked out to get Figueres away from the scene of expected trouble and Figueres asked a friend in the State Department to pull Williamson out of the country, a move that reportedly infuriated Ploeser.

Meanwhile, Lawrence E. Harrison, chief of the aid mission here and architect of a \$22 million program aimed primarily at improving Costa Rican agriculture, had gone to Washington for what were described as routine consultations. Harrison had not gotten along with the ambassador, who is described by embassy sources as feeling that Harrison was too close to an administration that was drifting dangerously to the left.

Harrison has not returned and will not return. Ploeser has assumed his responsibilities as chief of the aid mission.

Against this background, former Ambassador Allen Stewart, an old friend of Figueres, was sent here to investigate. He is reported on the best of authority to have told Figueres that official cables reaching Washington had described the situation as dangerous. Figueres was accused of abandoning the West and facing East, of having accepted financial assistance from the Communists for his campaign, of permitting Communists to infiltrate his government.

Figueres, who has been called "disgustingly pro-United States," told Stewart that he remained solidly anti-Communist. Stewart reportedly left Costa Rica convinced that the charges were without foundation.

Shortly afterward, following another Figueres request for the recall of Williamson, this time submitted formally by Costa Rica's ambassador in Washington, Williamson was withdrawn.

Ploeser contends that Williamson's departure was a routine transfer. If any plot existed, he has

STATINTL

# Warm African Welcome Spreads Glow in Paris

By Anatole Shub

Washington Post Foreign Service

PARIS—A glow of self-satisfaction radiated through pro-government circles in the wake of French President Pompidou's recent successful 10-day tour of five former West African colonies, all of them still loyal members of the "Franc Zone".

Official and semi-official commentaries, while emphasizing "historic links" and "new perspectives for cooperation" between France and the old empire, also disclosed at least two more concrete grounds for satisfaction. One was directed at "les Anglo-Saxons," the other at French public opinion.

The very fact that Pompidou was able to make the tour, and to be cheered by well-marched throngs numbering hundreds of thousands, demonstrated how firm the hold of pro-French regimes—and some 200,000 resident Frenchmen—remains in West Africa, as compared with British influence in its former colonies and U.S. standing in much of Latin America.

Few thought Edward Heath or Richard Nixon could make a similar tour. To be sure, in Dakar, Senegal, Pompidou arrived and departed with maximum security precautions, and mostly stayed within 800 yards of his official residence. On the other hand, in Libreville, capital of mineral-rich Gabon, the French chief of state could be greeted by such unashamedly neocolonialist banners as: "Let us improve France in building Gabon."

While official toasts and speeches exalted the glories of a "common culture" expressed in Francophonie, (speaking French) and lip service was paid to eventual "Africanization," whites outnumbered blacks at the mammoth state receptions for Pompidou. The French president did not hesitate to emphasize publicly that the "Franc Zone" would remain a solid bloc—in contrast to such shaky enterprises as the Commonwealth and the sterling area.

Indeed, in off-the-cuff remarks, Pompidou joked freely about some of the means by which France has retained control. At Libreville, where French paratroopers put down an anti-French revolt in 1964, a Gabonese journalist asked him whether the "new era" of "cooperation" might mean some change in the old French style of managing coups d'état to keep Africa in line.

"Me?" Pompidou exclaimed in mock horror, "I never make coups d'état. Perhaps in France, but certainly never in Africa." Then, with a broad smile, Pompidou added: "Of course, there is always Monsieur Foccart on permanent duty."

He was referring to Jacques Foccart, who—under the unassuming title of secretary general at the presidency for African and Malagasy affairs—has long directed an intricate variety of overt, semi-overt and utterly covert services and enterprises which, critics charge, constitute Francophone Africa's "invisible government."

As nearly everyone but the

glum Foccart laughed at Pompidou's jest, an admiring observer remarked: "Can you imagine Nixon being able to joke that way about the C.I.A. in Guatemala City?"

If Pompidou's trip represented a triumph for Paris over London and Washington in demonstrated ability to manage its corner of the Third World, it also appears to have quieted, at least for the time being, the heresy in French public opinion known as "Cartierism". The journalist Raymond Cartier most pungently expressed the view that Africa represented a useless drain on French taxpayers' money, which would better be used at home.

Public opinion polls published here after Pompidou's tour showed that a clear majority of Frenchmen are now convinced, despite Cartier, that "cooperation" with Africa and the third world should continue. To achieve this result, Pompidou, Foccart and others began disclosing some of the facts and figures on how France (or at least some big French interests) profits mightily from its African economic operations.

Moreover, Pompidou made clear a shift in style and emphasis—with French private business, foreign investors, European community and international lending organizations putting up more of the money, as direct aid from the French budget is phased down.

Since all the Francophone states are one-party police re-

gimes, and the Gaullist majority in Paris has prevented any parliamentary exploration of Foccartian economics, there are no hard statistics to show exactly how much of African "economic development" is going into the pockets of the French state, French private interests, and pro-French African politicians.

However, Cecil Rhodes might well envy French skill in Gabon. Where the manganese mines could export 2 million tons a year for the next 100 years, the uranium mines fuel France's "force de frappe," and reserves of a billion tons of rich iron ore await construction of a railroad for exploitation. West Germany, the World Bank and Bethlehem Steel are now expected to share costs of building the long-delayed railroad with the French and Gabonese governments.

Significantly, Gabon's young president, Albert

Bongo, recently assumed the portfolio of minister of mines, in addition to those he already held—defense, information, planning and economic development. While foreign critics charge Bongo with profiteering, Bongo cheerfully admits: "I'm like a woman. The more I get, the more I want."

Eight French advisers in Bongo's presidential secretariat alone make sure that Paris profits, too.

STATINTL

ST. LOUIS, MO.  
POST-DISPATCH

E - 333,224  
S - 558,018

FEB 5 1971

### *Recalling Jacobo Arbenz*

The recent death of Jacobo Arbenz Guzman in Mexico recalls some unpleasant history of American intervention. Mr. Arbenz was elected president of Guatemala in 1950 and immediately embarked on one of the broadest programs for giving land to the peasantry. Among other lands he seized United Fruit Co. holdings. The company challenged the compensation and the Government backed the firm.

While the Arbenz government made no secret of its left-wing nationalism, Mr. Arbenz himself denied he was under Communist influence. However, in May 1954 the State Department announced that a shipload of arms from Communist Poland had been landed in Guatemala. In mid-June Col. Carlos Castillo Armas led an invasion force from Honduras and overthrew the Arbenz government. The invaders were backed by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The timing was interesting. Only about two months elapsed from Washington's discovery of Communist arms shipments to the overthrow of Arbenz. The immediate protestation that the United States had nothing to do with the ouster was more than hard to swallow. Afterward, the CIA seemed both proud and secretive about its victory. Secretary of State Dulles openly boasted about it. But the results were nothing to boast about, for the announced dream of making Guatemala a showcase for democracy in the Caribbean was lost in a nightmare of political reaction.

The Arbenz case is only a chapter in a long story. Yankee intervention in Latin America was old hat when he was ousted. There followed eight years later the CIA's disaster at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba. By that time Washington might have concluded that Guatemala was not Cuba, and that intervention was not worth the political and moral risks even where it succeeded militarily. Yet Marines landed in the Dominican Republic three years after the Bay of Pigs. As the story goes on, the lessons only echo.

Feb 1971

STATINTL


# can christians aid violence?

by Peter J. Riga

*The protest against the gift of \$200,000 by the World Council of Churches to revolutionaries in Africa raises a hard and embarrassing question. Can Christians use force on the international scene to defend justice and deny its use to*

Latin America and Southeast Asia).

This papal thrust is bold and powerful in view of the fact that officially-sanctioned torture — as reported by the UN — is on the increase all over the world (Vietnam, Brazil, Middle East). This offends against basic justice as a totally unconscionable invasion of the rights of the human person, even if done for reasons of furthering justice. The scholastic adage is as valid now as it ever was in times past: the ends and the means are of the same generic order. The end can be no more



*Africans struggling for justice? Father Peter Riga discusses the question especially from the angle of its relevance to American Christians. Father Riga teaches theology at St. Mary's College in California.*

In recent days, Pope Paul VI has deplored and denounced the use of violence and political terrorism as a means of social change. A few weeks ago (October 20, 1970) the Pope denounced both official torture (as practiced today in Brazil in an official capacity) and subversive violence and terrorism (practiced in practically all countries of

worthy or good than the means and if the means are murderous and unjust, what can be born of it but more murder and injustice? Whatever is accomplished by means of violence and murder will be, by its very nature, violent and murderous. The Pope is certainly on traditional ground here in moral ethics.

Moreover, it is good to see that the acts he denounces are specified as applying to particular governments today and not as generalities. Some would say that his protests are not specific enough

28 JAN 1971

# Ex-Guatemala President Arbenz

## Dies

By Terri Shaw

Washington Post Staff Writer

Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, former Guatemalan president whose leftist government was overthrown by a U.S.-backed invasion in 1954, was found dead yesterday in his bathtub in Mexico City. He was 57.

Mexican officials said that Arbenz, who was president of Guatemala from 1951 to 1954, had drowned in the tub at the suburban house where he had lived with friends for the past eight months.

The district attorney said preliminary medical reports indicated that the former Guatemalan president had slipped, hit his head on the edge of the bath and fallen unconscious into the water.

Police said that when Arbenz had not appeared for a long time after going to take a bath, his servants tried to open the door but found it locked. They then summoned the police, who broke down the door and found Arbenz dead in the tub.

Arbenz had been hospitalized with a gastrointestinal disorder last October, but his daughter Leonora, who identified the body, said he had not been ill recently.

The Arbenz administration's efforts to make radical changes in the economic and social structure of the Central American republic brought it a certain notoriety in the Western Hemisphere and eventually the open opposition of the United States.

The tall, lean, chain-smoking president was widely accused of bringing Communists into the government and relying heavily on their assistance and advice. Arbenz steadfastly denied that he was a Communist and that Communists wielded excessive power in his regime.

Guatemalans considered his personality something of an enigma. As the son of a Swiss druggist and a career military man he was not accepted by the Guatemalan aristocracy. However, he married the daughter of a prominent Salvadorean family.

His wife, a strong-willed woman with important political contacts was believed to have influenced him to become involved in politics. As a young colonel, Arbenz was a member of the junta that in 1944 overthrew Gen. Jorge Ubico who had ruled Guatemala as a rigid military dictatorship for more than a decade.

Arbenz was active in the "Revolutionary of 1944" that sought to restructure Guatemala's economy and feudal social system. As minister of defense, Arbenz gained a considerable amount of power in the reformist administration of Juan Jose Arevalo.

Arbenz' main rival to succeed Arevalo at the end of his term in 1950 was assassinated under mysterious circumstances in 1949, and Arbenz has often been accused of complicity in the crime. He was easily elected president after Arevalo stepped down.

In his inaugural address, Arbenz promised to make Guatemala an enlightened, capitalist economy and model of democracy, and to continue the reforms of Arevalo.

The most crucial of the changes attempted by the Arbenz regime was the agrarian reform, which brought strenuous opposition from Guatemala's powerful landowners.

Arbenz also attempted to bring the country's Indians—more than 60 per cent of the population—into the economic mainstream and to give workers a greater voice in the country's political and economic life. The administration also broadened Guatemala's ties with Communist countries.

Arbenz was widely criticized for employing foreign leftists in the government.

One of these was an Argentine physician named Ernesto

served as an inspector for the agrarian reform agency.

The administration did not hesitate to use strong-arm tactics to enforce its policies. Four judges were dismissed from the Supreme Court when they challenged the constitutionality of the agrarian reform law, and mobs of Indians were encouraged to invade unused land.

However, it was international pressures that brought the Arbenz regime to a crisis. Early targets of the "revolution" were the American-owned electric company, the British-owned International Railways of Central America and the very powerful United Fruit Company.

After the government expropriated some uncultivated fruit company land and offered the company only the assessed value (about \$760,000) the U.S. government stepped in. On March 23, 1953, Washington demanded adequate compensation for the fruit company land, and a year later the United States insisted on a reparation of more than \$15 million.

By then it was known that Guatemalan exiles were being trained in neighboring countries to overthrow Arbenz, and it was widely believed that they had assistance from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles attended the 10th Inter-American Conference in Caracas in March, 1954, and pushed through an anti-Communist resolution opposed only by Guatemala.

Arbenz, fearing an invasion and knowing that he could get no more military aid from the United States, ordered weapons from behind the Iron Curtain. A shipment of arms from Poland was unloaded in Puerto Barrios, setting off an anti-Communist furor in Guatemala and the neighboring countries. The United States immediately sent additional troops to El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua where

Guatemalan exiles were preparing an invasion.

Guatemala appealed to the United Nations, but the Security Council turned the issue over to the Organization of American States despite Soviet opposition.

Before the OAS fact-finding commission could get to Guatemala City, an exile force led by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas had taken over the government.

Arbenz was allowed to go into exile in Mexico, and later lived in Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Cuba. Reuter reported that Arbenz gave an interview in a hospital last November in which he expressed strong disapproval of current leftist activities in the Western Hemisphere.

Arbenz' wife, Maria, who has been living in her home country of El Salvador, was informed through Guatemalan diplomatic channels of his death.

Last night in Guatemala City the government of President Carlos Arana Osorio announced on television that it would help Arbenz' relatives bring the former president's body home for burial if they requested this.

Arbenz was survived by two sons as well as his widow and daughter.

## TOWARD LEGISLATIVE CONTROL OF THE C.I.A.

STANLEY N. FUTTERMAN\*

### I. INTRODUCTION

Every few years the C.I.A. is rediscovered. The inspiration is rarely the same: Guatemala in 1954; the U-2 incident in 1960; the Bay of Pigs in 1961; support for the National Students Association in 1967. This year it is mainly Laos.

How far the Nixon Administration has been forced to come in the past year in acknowledging the C.I.A.'s role in Laos may be seen by a comparison of two official reports. In March, 1970, in response to increasingly detailed newspaper reports and rising pressures from Congress, President Nixon issued a 3,000 word statement on Laos, including a nine point description of "the precise nature of our aid to Laos."<sup>1</sup> There was no mention of the Central Intelligence Agency. On August 3, 1971 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a staff report on the situation in Laos, cleared for publication by the Administration after 5 weeks of negotiation with the Committee staff. The published report reflects numerous deletions insisted on by the Administration but includes the now officially conceded revelation that "the most effective [friendly] military force in Laos is not the Royal Lao Army, but the . . . irregular forces which are trained, equipped, supported, advised, and to a great extent, organized by the C.I.A."<sup>2</sup>

There have been revelations about C.I.A. foreign operations before and official or semi-official confirmations of them. What is unusual about the official confirmations of C.I.A. operations in Laos is that they have been forced out of the Administration while the activities are still in progress. The revelations come also at a time when the Congress is heavily engaged in an effort to legislate limits to the President's discretion in foreign affairs.

These events have led to the introduction in the present Congress of several bills which comprise the first proposed legislation intended to bring the C.I.A.'s foreign operations under substantive legislative restraints. It is not that past years were without congressional flurries over the C.I.A. Over the years some 132 bills had been introduced either to establish standing committees to oversee the C.I.A.'s activities or to authorize special investigations of the C.I.A.'s role. Not one passed, and only two ever reached the floor of even one House, where both were decisively defeated by better than two-thirds majorities.<sup>3</sup> The remarkable thing is that the activity was all confined to jurisdictional battles within the Congress. The traditional issue has been which small group of Senators and Representatives would be privy to the doings of the C.I.A.

Not until 1967 was the first bill introduced to limit what the C.I.A. could do with its funds: Rep. Ryan's measure to prohibit the C.I.A. from contributing funds to domestic organizations.<sup>4</sup> The Johnson Administration avoided what surely would have been considerable pressure for such legislation only by announcing that all existing covert financial assistance to the nation's educational and private organizations would be terminated by about the end of the year.<sup>5</sup> More recently, Congress has compelled the Nixon Administration to terminate covert C.I.A. funding of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty and forced it to seek legislation to provide open gov-

STATINTL

# Catholic Sentinel



Your World

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## Negative Image for U.S.

By GARY MacEOIN

President Eisenhower made two admissions very damaging to the image of the United States in his memoirs published in 1963. He revealed that his government had played a major part in organizing and equipping an invasion force which in 1954 had overthrown the popularly elected government of Guatemala, a fact which had been officially denied by that government at the time. And he revealed that he had taken a key decision on that invasion at the urging of the head of the CIA and over the strong opposition of the State Department.



Subsequently it has become a matter of general knowledge that the monopoly of the conduct of our foreign affairs vested in the State Department by law from the foundation of the republic has been gravely breached. Both in Latin America and elsewhere, the

Pentagon and the CIA, sometimes working separately and sometimes in collusion, have taken a major hand in our decision making. The heads of military missions attached to embassies throughout the continent do not report to the ambassador but to their own chiefs.

Something even more sinister emerged during the past year. The mammoth military intelligence agencies spawned by the Cold War, the National Security Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency, have moved into the domestic field. They are engaged in secret surveillance of political candidates, public officials, student protesters and even academic courses, storing the information in a computerized data bank.

Those who have had the misfortune of having inaccurate credit information about them fed into a computer know how damaging an error can be in this age of total recall and universal exchange of information between the mechanical monsters. An error about a citizen's reliability or his patriotism could be far more damaging, and also harder for him to correct or even discover because of the protection afforded the Pentagon's snoopers. And the type of information they provided for the invasion of Cambodia and for the frustrated rescue of prisoners in North Vietnam hardly qualifies them as infallible.

That, however, is only a secondary reason for condemning this development. Even if the accuracy of the Pentagon's information could be guaranteed, it has no business in surveillance of the civilian population. Our

claimed reason for embarking on the Cold War in the first instance was to ensure the survival of our democratic institutions threatened by totalitarianism. If we adopt totalitarian methods, we have automatically lost the war.

It is impossible to overestimate the harm done to us internationally by this evidence of the growing power and influence of the military establishment in our society. Our negative image is already such that in many parts of the world the CIA has become "the bogey that communism has been for America," to quote English historian Arnold Toynbee. "Wherever there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy," he has said, "the rest of us are now quick to suspect the CIA has had a hand in it."

Under fire, the Defense Secretary has promised to bring domestic military intelligence operations under tight civilian control "consistent with constitutional rights." Unfortunately the record of the Department is such as to give no assurance that the promise will be kept. As recently as last April there was an official denial that it was engaged in the activities which it now promises to curtail. The official lie in 1954 was at least intended to deceive the enemies of the United States. The more recent one was directed against its citizens.

But even if we could believe it, this assurance would not meet the substantive issue. Our liberties must not be at the mercy of a bureaucrat, least of all one who is a part of the military machine. We are well equipped with civilian agencies answerable to Congress for ensuring citizen con-

PHILADELPHIA, PA.

BULLETIN

SEP 25 1970

E - 640,783

S - 681,831

### Guatemala's poor

Having lived in Guatemala from October 1954 until June 1964, I am disturbed by some of the misleading statements in the second article about Diana Oughton which describes her two years in Guatemala.

The left wing Guatemalan regime which the CIA helped to overthrow in 1954 should be more correctly described as Communist. Jacobo Arbenz, the hand picked successor to outgoing president, Juan Jose Arrevalo (who was sympathetic to Communist ideology and who wrote a highly anti-American book) won the election because the most popular political opponent to Arbenz had been conveniently assassinated while traveling on the highway between Guatemala City and Lake Amatitlan.

It is also unfair to imply that only the richest ruling families wanted to keep the poorer people in their place. My husband, employed by AID, was in charge of construction on a new government run rubber and coco farm. He supervised the building of some 20 houses with modern indoor plumbing for the families of the laborers. Many of these people had never had indoor toilets before. A few years after all building on the farm had been completed, AID turned over control to the Guatemalans. After three years of Guatemalan administration, the laborers were gradually being evicted from their homes, because the technicians, middle class Guatemalans, who had formerly commuted at no expense to themselves from nearby towns wanted to live in the rent free houses.

Under American administration the lower paid employees were given a break. When their own people took over, they were the last to be considered.

M. W. Rogers

STATINTL

WASHINGTON STAR

22 SEP 1970

MARY McGRORY

## Agnew's Agility Routs the Young

Vice President Agnew's victory over the young was written all over their stricken faces as they gathered for a post-mortem of the taping of the David Frost show.

"Of course, he won," mourned young Gregory Craig, a Harvard graduate and Yale Law School student. "I had no idea he was so crass and controlled and unflappable. He was completely different from the way he's been on the campaign."

Agnew had checked the alliteration and the abuse of the stump at the studio door yesterday. He knew his only job was to be either lighter and heavier than his student critics, whichever way they went.

He had a strategy, and they had only their indignation and their frustration. He just wanted the chance to hammer home the point the administration has made gospel to Middle America — that campus violence is a greater threat to the peace of the country than the war in Vietnam. His recurring noun was "violence," his adjective "violent," his adverb "violently."

They were obviously torn. They wanted to use the opportunity to show Middle America they could be polite and nice.

And they also had in mind the campus constituency that would want them to mix it up with the big slugger who has fingered them as public enemy No. 1.

Agnew smoothly agreed with Craig about the need for "civil discourse" in the campaign, but promptly demonstrated that he was not going to be bound by Marquis of Queensberry rules in any "adversary proceedings."

He accused Eva Jefferson, the president of the Northwestern University student body, of having told the Scranton Commission on campus violence that "violence is the only way to get results." It took Miss Jefferson, a buxom, cello-voiced black girl about 19 minutes to establish the fact that she had merely been quoting the more radical and revolutionary elements of her student constituency.

Midway, the vice president observed, almost absently, that he did not believe in "violence as a way of protest." When she said sharply that she did not advocate violence, he replied in a condescending tone that he knew would appeal to his following among the lunch-pail set, "Just what do you advocate, young lady?"

The students had not done their homework on Agnew's

favorite subject. They never mentioned the Heard report on campus unrest, which squarely puts the burden for campus turmoil on President Nixon. They tried to cover too much ground — health care, school integration and Black Panthers.

When the big attack came, it was from an ideal source from Agnew's point of view. Richard Silverman, a long-haired, bearded Stanford alumnus who is a student leader at the University of Washington, spoke in the lingo of the coffee house and the student rally that puts Middle America's teeth on edge.

He compared the "obscenity" of the censored chants that interrupt Agnewian speeches with the "obscenity" of the Vietnam war. He spoke of CIA intervention in Guatemala and "blood on American hands."

Still, he brought the argument to its cutting edge — the double standard of the administration toward violence. Why, he wanted to know, did the President receive the hard-hats who beat up peace demonstrators at the White House while he blamed the students for the killings at Kent State.

Agnew spoke of Kent State and its "aura of violence" as

if the tragedy had occurred in a vacuum of destructive students and permissive officials, an orgy of rock-throwing, window-breaking and building-burning which is what the administration wants the public to think of all campus disorders.

Agnew ground on with a hymn to the hard-hats — "men who work with their hands swept by a wave of revulsion when they saw the flag reviled." He defended the National Guard before Silverman finally got around to mentioning the Cambodian invasion, which was the immediate cause of the tragic demonstration at Kent.

The vice president may have done violence to morality and logic, but he had routed the young, who will have to go back and tell the gang that Agnew is no joker.

Afterward, in their sad locker-room session, some of the students who had been chosen but never got to speak, blamed the format of the show to be broadcast Friday night, and blamed David Frost.

But Eva Jefferson said somberly, "It wasn't a conspiracy, it was our fault."

19 SEP 1970

STATINTL

# CIA implicated in killing of Yon Sosa

STATINTL

By Anibal Suarez  
Prensa Latina

## Guatemala City

Evidence seems to point to CIA complicity in the death of the Guatemalan guerrilla leader, Marco Antonio Yon Sosa, who was killed on Mexican territory May 19 under "obscure" circumstances.

Yon Sosa was 39 when he was gunned down by Mexican soldiers. He had founded the "13th of November" revolutionary movement (M-13-N) which was named after the uprising (on that date in 1960) of a group of young officers against the government of Gen. Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes. Among the promoters of that military rebellion were Luis Augusto Turcios Lima and Alejandro Ramirez, both now dead.

From the beginning, the Latin American press suspected that Yon Sosa's death was an organized international intelligence operation. Montevideo's *Marcha* magazine declared that the death of the head of the M-13-N was an "unexplained event" and at the same time rejected as absurd the version of the Mexican Minister of Defense, Gen. Marcelino Garcia Barragan, who declared that "the Guatemalan guerrilla had attacked the Mexican army." *Marcha* suggested that either Yon Sosa and his comrades were trying to leave Guatemala through Mexico; or they were caught by surprise before they could ask for asylum. "In any

case the action of the Mexican government constitutes an unacceptable violation," concluded *Marcha*.

## "Yankee crime"

In Santiago de Chile, the newspaper *El Clarin* published a report by Augusto Olivares entitled, "New Yankee crime in Guatemala," which remarked: "Once more the Mexican government has given a hand to the North American government."

The Peruvian magazine *Oiga* commented in its May issue: "Mexico could not have made a better present to Guatemalan president Col. Carlos Arana Osorio than the death of Marco A. Yon Sosa."

The official report issued by the commander of the Mexican troops, Luis Barqueras Turcios, supports the thesis that the death of the guerrilla major was not accidental. This report makes it obvious that the Mexican army was kept posted about the guerrilla movements in Guatemalan territory.

Barqueras Turcios reported to the commander of the 31st Military Zone in these words: "Following your verbal instructions of Saturday 16, I proceeded, with the personnel under my command to search for armed persons in the area of the Lacantun river mouth, under the assumption that Guatemalan guerrillas had crossed over to Mexican territory."

Other Latin American publications shifted from mere suspicion to actual revelations of the participation of the CIA in the action at the Lacantun river. The Guatemalan paper *El Grafico*, reprinting an article titled, "The guerrillas, from the country to the city," originally published by the Mexican paper *Excelsior* and Chile's *Ercilla* magazine. The article states: "The fate of the leader of the '13th of November' Movement was decided right after the abduction of Sean Michael Holly, a U.S. official on March 6."

It also quotes *Confirmado* magazine, which is closely related to Argentina's armed forces, as follows: "A U.S. Armed Forces aircraft arrived at midnight of March 7 at La Aurora airport (Guatemala) carrying a dozen CIA agents and a group of Green Berets to cooperate in the search for the North American labor attaché."

These special "envoys" did not return to their base of operations, in the Panama Canal Zone, on March 8, when Holly was released in exchange for three guerrillas. "After that all efforts were aimed at finding Yon Sosa's tracks, until they located a definitive trail on May 19. Because of the close pursuit, the guerrilla leader decided on crossing the Mexican border," asserts the article in *El Grafico*.

"However," it adds, "the Mexican army, which displayed the strictest vigilance along the border, had been informed about the pursuit operation. Finally, the only shot which occurred near Lacantun river, in the state of Chiapas."

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The Making of a TerroristDiana Discards  
Riches for Toil  
In Guatemala

Second of five articles tracing the chain of events that brought Diana Oughton from wealth and social prominence to a self-declared outlawry and ended in her death at 28 from an explosion that rocked the illicit bomb factory where she lived.

By LUCINDA FRANKS and THOMAS POWERS  
United Press International

By the time she had graduated from Bryn Mawr in July, 1963, Diana Oughton had traveled among the poor in Europe and worked with children in a Philadelphia ghetto, but she did not begin really to learn about poverty until she went to Guatemala.

When she filled out a personal information form after being accepted by the Quaker-run Voluntary International Service Assignments (VISA) program, she put a single word after Experience:

"None."

BARBARA ANN GRAVES, director of VISA, felt Diana's sheltered upbringing and gentle character would be a handicap and tried to dissuade her from a lonely assignment in the back-country. Diana refused to be given special consideration and was assigned to isolated Chichicastenango, Guatemala.

Chichicastenango is a small, primitive Indian market town where Catholic priests look the other way when Indians burn incense to the old gods and beat ceremonial drums on the church steps.

When Diana arrived, she was struck by the gaudy vitality of the town, by the bright shawls of the Indians, the rambling streets, whitewashed buildings, church bells and the surrounding jungle, a damp rank tangle of vines, undergrowth and towering trees.

SHE WAS DELIGHTED by the market where Indians came to sell cakes of brown sugar, earthenware, hand-woven cloth, firewood, vegetables and freshly killed goats, pigs and chickens.

Gradually, however, Diana began to see other things — the Indians' bad health, their short stature, the small, child-sized coffins sold in such numbers in the market.

She plunged into work, helping local priests launch a nutritional program, editing a newspaper for adults who were just learning how to read, and helping care for the children who swarmed through the town.

She went shopping in the market two or three times a week, learning to bargain over carrots and cabbages. And she began to know and respect Father Jose Maria Casas, an energetic middle-aged man who had spent many years helping the Indians.

The directors of VISA in Guatemala City, Bill and Donna Dreyer, began with the same doubts about Diana that Barbara Ann Graves had felt. When they saw the speed with which Diana learned Spanish and the rapport she established with the priests and the people of Chichicastenango, their doubts disappeared.

## Meets Radical

After Diana had been living in Guatemala for several months she met Alan Howard, a Fulbright scholar in Guatemala City. He was running an experimental adult reading program in a prison. Conversations with political prisoners had made him cynical about the chances of peaceful change in the country.

When Diana told him about the work she was doing in Chichicastenango, Howard said it would never end the poverty of the Indians.

"You're only delaying the revolution," he told her.

He argued that VISA was treating the symptoms of poverty, not the basic causes. He recalled another Fulbright scholar who had planned to spend a year studying the country's corporate structure, but completed his project in a week. There was no corporate structure, he said, only a handful of ruling families.

Whenever Diana was in Guatemala City, she would spend the evening with Howard, talking about the peaceful revolution envisioned by the Quakers and the violent revolution already under way in the mountains to the east. Howard argued that Guatemala's only hope for fundamental change lay with guerrilla leaders like Luis Turcios.

Howard's views were shared by one of Diana's Guatemalan friends who prescribed violence even more bluntly.

"What this country needs," he told her, "is to line up the 50 first families against the white wall."

## Difficult Ideas

Diana found such ideas hard to accept. She was not necessarily against violence in extreme circumstances. But, like most Americans, she always had assumed that hard work could achieve the same ends with less suffering.

Throughout her two years in Guatemala, Diana struggled with the questions of poverty, social justice and revolution. She and Ann Aleman, another VISA volunteer in Chichicastenango, had been exposed to the country's deep contradictions from the moment they had arrived. For example, the priests warned them bluntly

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S 14048

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

August 24, 1970

pertinent circumstances at the time. We do not, however, ask those governments to meet demands that are considered extreme; to do so would only serve to encourage terrorist groups to kidnap others.

Mr. President, I concur with the statements made by Secretary of State Rogers and the U.S. delegation to the OAS, and I believe the U.S. position deserves the full support of the Senate.

Unless something is done Americans and officials of other countries will continue to be harassed. On August 19, 1970, a group of Tupamaros kidnaped an American, Stephen Spann, held him for an hour, used his car in an attempted robbery, and released him. Although there may not have been any political implications intended in this abduction, the Spann incident does indicate that terrorists continue unabated to endanger the lives and freedom of Americans abroad.

The OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee will soon begin its work. The United States has presented a position which condemns kidnaping as an international crime, and which calls for appropriate measures to deal with such crimes. However, there could be an effort made by other Latin American governments to neutralize any international agreement which would serve as an effective deterrent against these heinous crimes.

For this reason, the United States must be strong in maintaining a position which would guarantee the safety of governmental and official personnel sent overseas, and thus I am introducing today for appropriate reference a resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should enter into agreements with other nations relating to measures to be taken against persons who unlawfully endanger the life and freedom of any official of a government of another nation or an international organization, or the life and freedom of a member of his family.

My resolution calls upon the President, as he is now doing, to take such action as may be necessary to secure, at the earliest practicable time, bilateral or multilateral agreements by which each signatory nation would agree to treat all such officials and members of their families with due respect, and to take all appropriate steps to prevent any threat or act which would unlawfully endanger the lives of such officials and members of their families.

In addition, each signatory nation would agree to take all measures properly within its jurisdiction to apprehend and to prosecute or extradite any person who commits, or threatens to commit such a threat or an act against such officials and members of their families.

Each signatory nation would agree—keeping in mind the need to act wisely in safeguarding the lives of such officials and members of their families—either, first, to refuse to accept any political hostages released as a result of such terrorist acts or threats; or second, to capture and hold in confinement for extradition, and to extradite any political hostages released as a result of terrorist acts who might have entered a country illegally.

My resolution also provides that each signatory nation would agree to withhold formal recognition of any government formed by terrorists who have participated in threats or acts endangering such officials and members of their families, and to take all other appropriate measures as may be necessary to deter any further terroristic activities.

This is an important resolution, and it merits early consideration by the Senate.

Mr. President, I submit the resolution, and ask unanimous consent that it, as well as the report prepared by the Library of Congress, be printed in the Record.

The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Boggs). The resolution will be received and appropriately referred; and, without objection, the resolution and the report will be printed in the Record.

The resolution (S. Res. 454) expressing the sense of the Senate that the United States should enter into agreements with other nations relating to measures to be taken against persons who unlawfully endanger the life and freedom of any official of a government of another nation or an international organization, or a member of his family, was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, and is printed in the Record, as follows:

## S. Res. 454

Whereas the maintenance of international peace and security and the promotion of friendly relations among nations depend on the orderly and effective conduct of relations among nations;

Whereas any threat or act by any person which unlawfully endangers the life or freedom of any official of the government of another nation or an international organization, or a member of his family, is abhorrent to a civilized society, contrary to the interests of world peace, and violates the fundamental rights and freedoms of man;

Whereas any threat or act unlawfully endangering the life or freedom of any official of the government of another nation or an international organization, or a member of his family, may affect the security and domestic stability of the nation where such threat or act occurs;

Whereas any threat or act unlawfully endangering the life or freedom of any official of the government of another nation or an international organization, or a member of his family, disrupts the efficient performance of functions vital to the comity of nations and the well-being of their people; and

Whereas threats and acts unlawfully endangering the life or freedom of any official of the government of another nation or an international organization, or a member of his family, constitute heinous acts which have aroused world rebuke: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President should take such steps as may be necessary to secure at the earliest practicable time bilateral or multilateral agreements by which each signatory nation agrees—

(1) to treat all officials of nations and international organizations, and members of their families, with due respect, and to take all appropriate steps to prevent any threat or act unlawfully endangering the life and freedom of any such official or member of his family;

(2) to take all measures properly within its jurisdiction to apprehend, prosecute, or extradite any person who commits, or threatens to commit, any such threat or act against an official of another nation or

an international organization, or a member of his family;

(3) consistent with the need to safeguard the lives of such officials, or members of their families, who have been placed in jeopardy by any threat or act unlawfully endangering their lives or freedom, to refuse to grant asylum to any person, and to capture and to hold in confinement for extradition any person, whose release from custody of another nation was achieved by means of any such threat or act;

(4) consistent with the need to safeguard the lives of such officials, or members of their families, who have been placed in jeopardy by any threat or act unlawfully endangering their lives or freedom, to extradite any such person so captured and confined to the appropriate authority of the nation from which he was released following the removal or cessation of any such threat or act;

(5) to withhold formal recognition of any government formed by any person, or group of persons, who have participated in such threat or act; and

(6) to undertake such other appropriate measures as may be necessary to deter any threat or act unlawfully endangering the lives or freedom of any such official or member of his family.

The report furnished by Mr. BYRD of West Virginia is as follows:

## RECENT TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER FOREIGN PERSONNEL IN LATIN AMERICA

(By Rieck B. Hannifin)

January 16, 1968, Guatemala, while returning from lunch, U.S. Army Colonel John D. Webber, commander of the 34-man U.S. military group in Guatemala, and Lieutenant Commander Ernest A. Munro, head of the group's navy section, were gunned to death by bullets from a passing car. Two U.S. military enlisted personnel were wounded in the attack. The following day the FAR (Armed Forces of the Revolution), a pro-Castro terrorist group, distributed leaflets throughout Guatemala City claiming responsibility for the assassinations. The leaflets declared that the shooting was to avenge murders by clandestine right-wing organizations which the FAR said received orders from the U.S. military mission.

U.S. Ambassador John G. Mein is said to have believed that the killings were an attempt to force an escalation of U.S. military strength in Guatemala, aimed both at arousing the population against the United States and at diverting U.S. soldiers and equipment from "wars of liberation" elsewhere (in short, Che Guevara's strategy of weakening the United States by creating various Vietnams).

(2) August 28, 1968, Guatemala, U.S. Ambassador to Guatemala John G. Mein was assassinated while enroute in the chauffeur-driven U.S. Embassy limousine from a luncheon at the Embassy residence to his office in downtown Guatemala City. The limousine was forced to the curb by a car, and blocked in from behind by a small truck. Several young men dressed in green fatigue uniforms and armed with at least one automatic weapon scrambled from their car and surrounded the Ambassador's limousine. Ambassador Mein leaped from his car and ran. He was struck in the back by a burst of submachine gun fire and killed instantly.

The following day the FAR issued a communique, given to the newspaper *El Imparcial*, announcing that Ambassador Mein was killed "while resisting political kidnapping as an answer to the capture of commandant Camilo Sanchez of the FAR." Sanchez, believed to have been in command of urban guerrilla units, reportedly was a prisoner in Guatemala City. It is speculated that the FAR sought to kidnap Mein as ransom for the release of Sanchez.

COMMONWEALTH  
26 JUNE 1970

STATINTL

## KIDNAPPED DIPLOMATS:

# GREEK TRAGEDY ON A LATIN STAGE

MARCIO MOREIRA ALVES

Karl Von Spreti, West Germany's ambassador, Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, Guatemala's lame-duck president and the unknown guerrilla soldier who pressed a trigger to kill Von Spreti are all helpless characters in a hopeless tragedy. The execution had many axmen. None was in full charge of his own act. From the moment the guerrilla forces presented their exchange conditions for the ambassador's life, they turned over the execution weapon to the ruling military group. Announcing their refusal to comply, the military fired the shot. Conditions were the oracle's utterance; refusal, destiny's agent; Von Spreti, the marked victim, a fated Oedipus. In this factual chain the most avoidable death became a logical ending.

Von Spreti's execution throws on each of us its collective guilt. Collective is the responsibility for the sacrifice of every innocent whose blood is spilled in the global confrontation between the forces of oppression and the bannerholders of transformation. The fact that the oppressed use violence similar to the oppressors' only aggravates the common guilt. We were all, even before, co-guilty of the murder of at least six thousand Guatemalan peasants, napalmed and shot by Carlos Arana, the colonel recently "elected" president of his country. Guilt was not made less terrible by ignorance, for very few of us were aware of the criminal character of political repression in Guatemala, always prudently silenced by American news-agencies and the so-called "serious" press. Now, responsibility is more direct. The ambassador's death brought to the world's front pages a forgotten war. Now that all know of it, no one has a pretext not to denounce it, not to pressure their own governments and not to mobilize their own peoples to prevent the official support of the great powers from keeping a criminal government in power, a government that sacrifices innocents in the struggle against the revolutionaries who move against it.

MARCIO MOREIRA ALVES, considered one of the leading spokesmen for the "Catholic Left" in Latin America, is a Brazilian journalist and ex-Congressman, now living in exile in Chile.

West Germany has already publicly declared that its ambassador's sacrifice was avoidable. No statement could be more obvious. A government that has never obeyed constitutional rules has no right to invoke them when at stake is the life of an innocent, a foreigner and a diplomat. A government that during the past three months had complied with kidnappers' demands to save the lives of its Secretary of State and an American attaché could not refuse to negotiate a third time. That it did has several explanations but no excuse.

First, there is a *real-politik* argument: the lives of a minister or of a representative of the dominant power were not risked. Secondly, it is extremely probable that many of the prisoners whose freedom was demanded had already been murdered by the police. At least one of them was killed while the ambassador was still alive. The Guatemalan government was not keen to announce its own crimes to the world. As an auxiliary argument, there is the recent example of Argentina, the refusal to accept the exchange of a Paraguayan consul for two political prisoners and the consul's release.

The "machismo" of Juan Carlos Ongania, Argentina's deposed dictator, seemed too beautiful not to be imitated by Arana Osorio's followers. But they did not ponder upon a few essential differences: In the case of Paraguay, the immediate economic domination is Argentinian; a consul is a third-rate representative; being third-rate, he might not be on close terms with Paraguay's dictator, General Alfredo Stroessner; General Ongania received a letter from his colleague across the border in which he refused to pay his part of the ransom.

The decisive argument for the refusal can be found in the theory of power of Guatemala's real rulers and their recently "elected" leader. Arana Osorio, during his presidential campaign, said that he would end kidnappings by shooting the prisoners demanded in exchange in a public square, one every half an hour. This brutal system is similar to the one proposed by the more radical Brazilian military when the American Ambassador, Mr. Charles Elbrick, was kidnapped in Rio de Janeiro. In Brazil the system was rejected, but from there its defend-



ers got a free hand in establishing torture of political prisoners as an official questioning routine. In Guatemala the prisoners are not yet shot in a public square, but the hostage was killed and the rightist terrorist organizations are taking bloody revenge.

The power theory supporting official terrorism is simple. Power exists to maintain the existing social and economic order. As this order is opposed to the interests of the immense majority of the people, which it exploits, power must be held by the armed forces, the group with enough coercion to defend it. Therefore, the armed forces are an occupation army, in the name of order. Guerrilla warfare is disorder. It is looked upon as a police problem, not a political one. It has to be destroyed by force. As a guerrilla fighter looks exactly like any common citizen, all nameless citizens are suspect and liable to summary execution. As the Army has to be deployed in regular combat and enormous search operations that tax all its resources, urban repression must be entrusted to civilian groups, be they police or rightist organizations. A close bond is woven between the Army and rightist banditry. "White terror" is officially supported to oppose the guerrillas. Its organizations grow: Organized Nationalist Anticommunist Movement (MANO), New Anticommunist Organization (NOA), Anticommunist Council of Guatemala (CADEG) and so forth. Rightist crimes multiply, the social situation worsens, leftist terror appears as a response.

The "anticommunism" of official terror is quite elastic. Eduardo Galeano, an Uruguayan journalist who interviewed Guatemala's guerrilla leaders and studied the country's political situation, says that "for a Guatemalan military man a 'Communist' is anyone whose ideas are different from those of the Guatemalan military; in short, a Communist is anyone who has ideas. In certain regions it's a crime to be young." And he goes on to give a long list of murders—the brother of Cesar Montes, a guerrilla leader, whose body was found three days after his arrest by the Army; Luis del Valle, found after the same delay after being arrested by the police; Tomas Guerrero, secretary of the government's party in Puerto Barrios; Jose Maria Rivera Flores, from the same Revolutionary Party, eleven members of this party in the state of Sanarate who, after being killed were listed as guerrillas, and many more. In 1968 Miss Guatemala was murdered by the MANO.

It is evident that in any country squeezed by rightist reaction and leftist revolution, diplomatic kidnappings will go on. Just as the air blockade of Cuba is a powerful incentive for airplane hijacking, the lack of legal guarantees is an incentive for kidnapping ambassadors. Where there are political prisoners there is a risk for foreign diplomats. This means that in almost all of Latin America, from Mexico, dominated by the Revolutionary Institutionalized Party (PRI) to Patagonia, held under the sway of the Argentinian 'gorillas,' no embassy or le-

gation can feel absolutely safe. Terror has its own rules. One is that in the absence of a court system all means are legitimate to get people out of the torture chambers. Blackmailing is the desperate man's habeas corpus.

Dividing the responsibilities for Count Von Sprei's death, one finds that not even his own government can plead not-guilty, even though it tried to pay the material part of the ransom and almost severed relations with Guatemala.

In criminal law the instigator and the murderer share the same sentence. The murderer, in this case, was the guerrilla organization. It could, in such a violent situation as Guatemala's, plead mitigating circumstances; it had no other choice. If the ambassador had been released, it would never again be able to create another position of force from which to negotiate with the government. Backing out would spread defeatism among the masses, on whose support it must lean to go on fighting. The revolution would have a setback and repression would increase.

The direct instigator, that is, the government of Guatemala, could also plead a mitigating circumstance: it considers itself at war. To put into the hands of the enemy the possibility of freeing prisoners could affect its survival in two ways: strengthening the cadres and popular prestige of the guerrillas and giving a pretext to the military groups to shorten the delay for a takeover. The military would argue, if the exchange was accepted, that the government was soft in the face of leftist threats.


No mitigating circumstances can be pleaded by the indirect instigators, the governments of the great powers and, especially, the U.S. They all have the basic responsibility for the survival of Guatemala's social and economic structures. In 1954, the C.I.A. organized the military revolution against Jacobo Arbenz, a reformist president. It openly armed and financed Colonel Castillo Armas, who became dictator. As a fringe benefit, United Fruit got back most of the lands that had been distributed to 120,000 landless families and Standard Oil got concessions—that it keeps as strategic reserves—for oil prospecting in almost half the country's territory. The concession agreement was submitted to the rubber stamp Congress in English and was translated into Spanish only after the protests of a less subservient congressman. The Central American Common Market, planned and applauded by Washington, profits only American corporations, the only ones with sufficient technological, financial and commercial capacity to operate in all the region's countries. The other developed capitalistic countries also take their share of profits from Guatemala's situation and the socialists, especially the Soviet Union, give loans and try to trade across ideological barriers.

The intervention of the developed or any other underdeveloped nation is immoral and not only when it takes the form of open armed invasion, as in the case of Cuba or the Dominican Republic. Being immoral, it cre-

ates reactions, that demand a price. Von Spreti paid this price with his life.

The survival of a political regime like Guatemala's is tightly connected with the international support it gets. The Army is armed and, in a substantial way, trained by the United States. The Treasury's most acute problems are covered by American money. Economic dependency is a consequence of the country's agricultural and financial integration with international capitalism. How long would the regime survive without this international help?

The OAS which, like the Interamerican Press Society, quickly reacts when U.S. financial interests are at stake,



expelled Cuba and approved the economic and diplomatic blockade of Castro's regime saying that its dictatorial character was against the organization's principles. How many times have the rightist terrorist regimes been threatened with the same sanctions? What sanctions were proposed against the torturers of Brazil, the butchers of Paraguay, the dictators of Argentina? When has anyone in the Organization of the American States gotten up to condemn the bloody dictatorships of Nicaragua, Santo Domingo or Honduras? Never. Condemnations are heard only against the military regimes of Peru and Bolivia, that do not murder their political foes but expropriate American oil concerns.

The Organization of the American States recognizes as untouchable only one human right: the right to private property. Can this organization, can these states that cover massacres with a shroud of silence, have the moral authority to protest against the murder of the German ambassador? They are among the instigators of this murder.

The sorrowful display made by the rightist Latin and North American press over Von Spreti's death was repulsive. Papers that didn't give three inches to the massacres of My Lai gave several full pages to the murder. Strangely, no reference was made to Guatemala's internal situation and its political regime. An Associated Press cable went so far as to call Colonel Arana Osorio the "antiguerrilla hero." Whose hero? The execution was presented as an isolated act of violence that leftist extremists perpetrated against a decent government. Only the Europeans, headed by the Germans that had been directly attacked, analyzed the situation by trying to di-

vide guilt between both parties. A young Frankfurt student said: "If they had kidnapped an American or one of their own ministers they would have freed their comrades." True. These are the rules.

It once more was clear in this case that systematic suppression of information is part of the system of continental domination that is responsible for Von Spreti's death. The press that so loudly cried over his body is an accomplice in his murder. Its partisan behavior is absolutely predictable. In Chile, for instance, when the government got a court order to seize a leftist magazine, *Punto Final*, the Interamerican Press Society was mute. But when an edition of an afternoon paper belonging to the *El Mercurio* group, stout defender of American interests and of reactionary positions, was seized, telegrams flew in like locusts. When the Peruvian government handed the property of *Expreso* and *Extra* over to its workers, the sky almost fell in. It was as if General Velasco Alvarado had made cannibalism legal and offered a banquet of roasted nuns. But when the Brazilian dictatorship keeps all mass media under strict censorship, it receives only formal polite protests. And when it arrests and tortures journalists, it can count on silence. The difference is that the Brazilian military men are pillars of the Western world, in favor of the accumulation of private property and great accumulators themselves.

A political condemnation, that is, a collective condemnation of the ambassador's execution can only be made if this and other similar cases are analyzed in the context of the total situation. The kidnapping of diplomats, like the bombing of some symbolic buildings, bank holdups or attacks on military barracks are part of a form of struggle—urban guerrilla warfare. Politically one has to ask if this form of warfare can lead to power and to the transformation of society, objectives that would justify it even theologically. (It is well to remember those who in Latin America like to quote Saint Thomas in favor of the present structures.)

Urban guerrilla warfare always carries the seeds of adventurism. An impatient armed group decides to start revolution by itself. Security arrangements make it cut itself from society in such a way that it tends to substitute itself for the revolutionary classes. Thrown into direct action, it has to abandon mass politics. A moral competition with the State's repressive apparatus starts. Military problems overshadow political leadership. The revolutionary's thought inverts itself; what is good for the armed struggle is considered good for the people. More and more the people are cut off from the contest. It starts to look upon the revolutionaries as if they were Indians in a Western. The people may pledge their emotional sympathies with the revolutionaries, but there is no way of taking part in the fight. The lack of popular participation in the process transforms its character—meant to be collective, it becomes individualistic. The revolutionary ceases to make revolution with the people and starts to

make revolution for the people. In an advanced stage of ideological decay, he considers the masses paralyzed. He arrives at the last point of his contradictions: he is willing to die for those he despises. So, in a terrible idealistic deformation, he dies bitterly.

If an armed action is not deeply related to the degree of political awareness of the masses it can be a help to the system. It focuses police attention, brings about more effective repressive methods, makes torture a questioning routine, etc. Greater repression makes people fear, and over a long haul, disrupts the organizing possibilities of the masses.

Theoretically, no revolutionary party ever inscribed terrorism among its methods. Terror is abjured by all, even the nineteenth-century anarchist. But individual violence always appears. There is always a group that labels itself a vanguard and starts to throw bombs. When the enemy is easily identified, as the troops, the French in Algiers, the Americans in Vietnam, this sort of action does not greatly impede the development of a popular war. But when the confrontation is exclusively internal, as in all civil wars, the results can be disastrous. In Russia, China or Cuba the revolutionaries began to hunt down the police's axmen only when the correlation between the forces of repression and the masses started to be more favorable to the masses.

The kidnapping of the Paraguayan consul in Buenos Aires was a clear act of adventurism. So were the New York bombings by radical student groups or the holdups by the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), in Chile. The kidnapping of the American Ambassador in Rio de

Janeiro, though it brought about many deaths and immense losses for the revolutionaries, may have had certain justifications. In Guatemala, having in mind the highly organized Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and the solid support it gets from large sectors, it is possible that a stronger revolutionary logic existed. There cannot be an *a priori* political condemnation of the kidnappers. It may be that their action was in relation to the degree of political activism of the local masses. What the murder certainly did was to trigger more rightist terrorism and to bring the struggle to a more acute point. On the other hand, it annulled the Argentinian effort to ban political asylum for prisoners freed in exchange of diplomats. From now on it will be extremely difficult for a Latin American government to refuse exchanges.

What must be condemned, from a moral point of view, is the ambassador's murder. The sacrifice of an innocent victim is always inexcusable. The sacrifice of millions of innocent victims, murder by oppressive structures, by what the Latin American Catholic bishops called "institutional violence," is unbearable. Both are collective crimes. The only way to avoid murder, be it individual or social, is to eliminate the oppressive structures.

Without the destruction of these rotted systems in which, as in the case of Guatemala, 2 percent of the landlords have 80 percent of the land or, as in Brazil, less than a million people earn more than \$6,500 a year, while 45 million earn less than \$130, these crimes will happen again and again. The destruction of oppressive structures and the creation of a new society has a single name: revolution.

NATION  
1 June 1970

STATINTL

GUATEMALA COLONEL**'A Real Good Relationship'****JOSEPH C. GOULDEN**

*Mr. Goulden, a Washington correspondent, was reporting from Latin America in 1966 as an Alicia Patterson Fund fellow.*

*Washington*

It was past two o'clock on a November morning in 1966. Our group was deep into the fourth bottle of Scotch, and Col. Carlos Arana Osorio held the floor, as he had most of the evening. Arana was an important man that fall—both in Zacapa, Guatemala, where we were drinking and talking in the Christian Brothers mission school, and in U.S. politico-military strategy for Latin America. As commander of the Zacapa military zone, Arana was charged with transforming into operational reality the W. W. Rostow theory that civic action and counterinsurgency programs can quell violent revolution.

In 1966 Zacapa, a dusty, hot department between Guatemala City and Puerto Barrios, was guerrilla territory, and an uncomfortable number of its walls and bridge abutments bore the whitewashed FAR of the Rebel Armed Forces, the Castro-oriented students and break-away army officers who were trying to topple the government of President Julio César Méndez Montenegro. Most of the 12,000-man Guatemalan army was tied down in Zacapa, fighting infrequent but pitched battles with the FAR; the remainder was busy chasing terrorists in the capital.

The U.S. Embassy and its military staff were damned proud of Arana, who in his four months as commander in Zacapa had sought and followed advice, and who appeared serious about civic action programs. He also had splendid rapport with officers in the U.S. attaché and advisory group. Several days earlier, at a dinner party in Guatemala City, Lieut. Col. Lunsford Thying, a former Green Beret instructor at the Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, had talked at length of his friendship with Arana: "Recently the FAR exploded a bomb at Carlos' home here. The first call he made when he heard of it was to me, so that I could check on his family. That's what he thinks of us. We have a real good close relationship."

For three days I had traveled with Arana through the remote *aldeas* tucked amidst Zacapa's rocky hills, looking at wells and nutrition clinics and schools built by the Guatemalan army and U.S. military and AID advisers. At his headquarters I watched an intelligence officer interrogate a *campesino* who had come in to volunteer information on FAR activities. Yes, indeed, Arana looked like a textbook example of how civic action and counterinsurgency were supposed to work.

Now we were relaxing with the Christian Brothers and some embassy people, drinking PX Scotch and eating deliciously ripe goat cheese brought in by its proud Zacapa manufacturer, an old schoolmate of the Colonel. Guards with submachine guns and carbines stood around Arana's

jeep in the courtyard, and several times he excused himself to take radio messages from his headquarters—reminders that this flat-bellied man in ever fresh khakis was, after all, fighting a civil war. During our previous conversations Arana had shied away from political talk; his military superiors earlier that year had permitted the popularly elected Méndez Montenegro to take office, and the army's colonels were under orders to keep out of politics. But in the quiet of the mission, warmed by the Scotch and the camaraderie, Arana suddenly decided to say something.

He leaned forward in his chair and slapped my thigh once, twice, thrice, a gesture I had learned to expect from Latins when they wanted to emphasize a statement.

"You know, my friend," he said, "there are some books that are necessary for anyone who wants to *begin* to understand Guatemala." And he listed them for me, writing the titles in my note pad in a rambling hand to insure that I got them right:

*The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, the spurious but widely circulated "master plan for Zionist domination of the world."

*View from the Fourth Floor*, by Earl Smith, former U.S. Ambassador to Cuba, which asserts that Communist influences in the State Department permitted Fidel Castro's rise to power.

*Who Killed Kennedy?*, by a leftist Latin journalist who claims that "Wall Street" caused the President's death because he threatened its financial domination of the United States and the countries in which U.S. investors have interests.

*America Peligra*, a Mexican version of Birchite paranoia which recites the shopworn conspiratorial theories so beloved by American right-wing nuts.

The next morning, over breakfast in the Hotel Ferrocarril, I showed Arana's list to a United States Information Service official who had been traveling with us. "My God," he said simply but emphatically, and poured himself another cup of coffee.

For the next two years Carlos Arana's reading list was an anecdote with which I gently needled Foreign Service friends humorless enough to expect something worth while to result from their incessant churning in Latin America. In a Washington totally preoccupied with Vietnam, Latin America got predictably short shrift. And especially Guatemala. In early 1968 a man phoned me to say that he had been named Guatemalan desk officer at the State Department, and would like to chat over lunch about the politicians there. It developed that he had never been in the country for which he was now responsible, save for a two-hour layover at La Aurora, the airport in the capital. Why not a fast orientation trip? I asked. "Not enough money," he said. "Secretary Rusk has put a freeze on nonessential travel."

That same week my newspaper office received a Pentagon press release about an official visit to the United

THE LISTENER (PUBLISHED BY B.B.C.)  
21 May 1970

## Robert Hunter on the CIA —Is it a department of dirty tricks, or an organisation of fact-gatherers? Did it underwrite the seizure of power by the Greek Colonels?



STATINTL

In the Ashenden stories, Somerset Maugham put a human face on the British Secret Service. No matter that the Hairless Mexican killed the wrong man: this bumbling helped soften the image of a ruthless and ever-competent machine dedicated to doing His Majesty's dirty business, and made

*Richard Helms, Director of the CIA*

everything right. Not so with the Central Intelligence Agency—or the CIA as it is everywhere known. No humour here; just the sense of a sinister and heartless manipulation of the democrats of a hundred coun-

WONTRFAL, P.Q.  
GAZETTE

M - 139,421  
MAY 8 1970

# America! America!

## Something's gone terribly wrong

**FASCISM:** a one-party system in which each class has its distinct place, function and representation in the government but the individual is subordinated to the state and control is maintained by military force, secret police, rigid censorship and government regimentation of industry and finance.

—Funk & Wagnell's Standard College Dictionary

Somewhere between the inauguration of John F. Kennedy in January, 1960, and the tragedy of Kent State University, May 4, 1970, something snapped in the spirit of America.

From the vigor and confidence of 1960, the U.S. has plummeted to a quagmire of bitterness in which the proudest tenets of its ostensible *raison d'être* are every day contradicted by reality.

Something terrible has happened in the land of the free and the home of the brave.

The "brave" — the fighting forces that have so long been America's pride and joy — now include men who have massacred women and chil-

dren at My Lai and God only knows how many other places in the jungles of Vietnam.

And in "the land of the free," four youngsters taking part in protest against the extension of an undeclared war are killed by the bullets of the United States National Guard.

It's hard to say at exactly what point the American Dream started turning to a nightmare. The sending of U.S. military "advisers" to Vietnam? The CIA coup in Guatemala? The assassination of President Kennedy? Of Martin Luther King? Of Bobby Kennedy? Or was it the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution? The siege of Columbia Uni-

versity? The Chicago Convention? Or perhaps the election of Richard Nixon and Spiro Agnew? ...

What's so frightening is that there are so many possibilities from which to choose.

Whatever its roots, the youth of America was the first to detect this malaise. Perhaps, to some extent, it was also youth that helped cause it. Youth certainly didn't precipitate the Vietnam war, but the attacks of some on what they perceived as a fascist society may have been a self-fulfilling diagnosis, helping to legitimize the inexcusable rigor mortis of thought that now pervades American government.

But now Nixon's Middle America is having its day and the people Nixon calls "campus bums" die under the rifle of the National Guard.

And increasingly, the hyperbole of the radicals is becoming only very slight exaggeration. The United

States may not yet be a fascist society, but it's beginning to come frighteningly close to the textbook definition.

The U.S. may not have a one-party system, but for American youth that makes scant difference. The politics of the two parties are so close that they are virtually interchangeable, and in an era of increasingly personal presi-

By  
George Radwanski



George Radwanski is a 23-year-old staff reporter who has reported on U.S. politics — including the 1968 Chicago Democratic Convention — for The Gazette.

Central government, youth and any other dissenters have virtually no voice.

There is increasing recourse to the use of military force — in the form of the National Guard — to quell dissent so widespread that no ordinary police can contain it.

The U.S. as yet has no "secret police" in the most deadly sense of the word, but the FBI sometimes comes painfully close. The shoot-outs with Black Panthers, the pursuit of draft dodgers into Canada, the infiltration of campus groups by police

informers — all these are disturbing indications of police zeal.

There is no legitimized censorship of the media in the U.S., either. But Spiro Agnew's pronouncements on the press and the response they evoke from Middle America don't bode well for future freedom of information.

### INTERWOVEN

As for government regimentation of industry and finance, it is a moot question whether it is government that regiments business or business that regiments government, so intimately have the two become interwoven to the exclusion of too many other interests.

If it is not fascism which hangs over the U.S. today — and it is probably only fair to say it is not — then it is at the very least a shadow of fascism, a chimera of authori-

# The Secret Team and the Games They Play

STATINTL

by L. Fletcher Prouty

"The hill costumes of the Meo tribesmen contrasted with the civilian clothes of United States military men riding in open jeeps and carrying M-16 rifles and pistols. These young Americans are mostly ex-Green Berets, hired on CIA contract to advise and train Laotian troops." Those matter-of-fact, almost weary sentences, written late in February by T.D. Allman of *The Washington Post* after he and two other enterprising correspondents left a guided tour and walked 12 miles over some hills in Laos to a secret base at Long Cheng, describe a situation that today may seem commonplace to anyone familiar with American operations overseas, but that no more than 10 years ago would have been unthinkable.

To take a detachment of regular troops, put its members into disguise, smuggle them out of the country so that neither the public nor the Congress knows they have left, and assign them to clandestine duties on foreign soil under the command of a non-military agency—it is doubtful that anyone would have dared to suggest taking such liberties with the armed forces and foreign relations of the United States, not to say with the Constitution, to any President up to and especially including Dwight D. Eisenhower. Indeed, the most remarkable development in the management of America's relations with other countries during the nine years since Mr. Eisenhower left office has been the assumption of more and more control over military and diplomatic operations abroad by men whose activities are secret, whose budget is secret, whose very identities as often as not are secret—in short a Secret Team whose actions only those implicated in them are in a position to monitor. How determinedly this secrecy is preserved, even when preserving it means denying the United States Army the right to discipline its own personnel, not to say the opportunity to do justice,

was strikingly illustrated not long ago by the refusal of the Central Intelligence Agency to provide witnesses for the court-martial that was to try eight Green Beret officers for murdering a suspected North Vietnamese spy, thus forcing the Army to drop the charges.

The Secret Team consists of security-cleared individuals in and out of government who receive secret intelligence data gathered by the CIA and the National Security Agency and who react to those data when it seems appropriate to them with paramilitary plans and activities, e.g., training and "advising"—a not exactly impenetrable euphemism for "leading into battle"—Laotian troops. Membership in the Team, granted on a "need to know" basis, varies with the nature and the location of the problems that come to its attention. At the heart of the Team, of course, are a handful of top executives of the CIA and of the National Security Council, most notably the chief White House adviser on foreign policy. Around them revolves a sort of inner ring of Presidential staff members, State Department officials, civilians and military men from the Pentagon, and career professionals in the intelligence services. And out beyond them is an extensive and intricate network of government officials with responsibility for or expertise in some specific field that touches on national security: think-tank analysts, businessmen who travel a lot or whose businesses (e.g., import-export or operating a cargo airline) are useful, academic experts in this or that technical subject or geographic region, and, quite importantly, alumni of the intelligence service—a service from which there are no unconditional resignations.

Thus the Secret Team is not a clandestine super-planning board or super-general staff but, even more damaging to the coherent conduct of foreign affairs, a bewildering collection of temporarily assembled action committees that respond pretty much ad hoc to specific troubles in various parts of the world, sometimes in ways that duplicate the

STATINTL

DETROIT, MICH.  
WEST SIDE COURIER  
APR 23 1970  
WEEKLY - 18,934

## *Murdering Diplomats*

For a century the way of life in Latin America has too often been revolutions. In many Latin American countries the wealthy upper class and the military rule the roost and control the government. The poor people get poorer, the average standard of living declining, and population soars.

Such a situation is an open invitation to communism, and many feel it is something of a miracle that several countries in this area have not already been taken over by the communists.

The latest sign of the dilemma is the rise of the custom of kidnapping foreign diplomats. In Guatemala, a country which escaped (with help from the CIA) only by the skin of its teeth from a communist takeover some 15 years ago, the German ambassador was recently kidnapped and murdered when the government refused the demands of his kidnapers.

U.S. diplomats in Latin America have been kidnapped on several occasions recently, as have others. It is hard to see how the basic problem, kidnapping being only a symptom, can be solved until overall living conditions are improved and the average living standard raised. Only when the vast majority of citizens respect their government and some stability is achieved will be diet of revolution, and now kidnapping, he ended.

APR 23 1970

E - 113,781

## C.I.A. Business?

Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro made a serious charge in blaming the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon for the recent landing of ~~armed~~ anti-Castro guerrillas in eastern Cuba. The United States did launch the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, so Castro has a reason to be suspicious.

The United States government denied involvement in the 1970 invasion. But Alpha 66, an association of Cuban exiles in Miami, says it trained the guerrillas at a secret base in the Florida Everglades and sent them to Cuba.

If so, this too is a violation of international law by the United States. All governments have an obligation not to permit armed bands to use their territory as a base to attack a country with which they are not at war. The United States has made some efforts to enforce this rule since the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, though the State Department does not accept the Russian thesis that the U.S. made a binding promise not to try to overthrow the Cuban government by force.

It would be possible for Alpha 66 to train and launch a small force without getting caught by the United States — and apparently this is a small force. By Wednesday Castro said his men had killed or captured nine and that only four remained.

But large operation or small, the legal principles are the same. Since the C.I.A. got found out for the Bay of Pigs and boasts leaked out about similar operations in Guatemala and Iran, it has been harder for the United States to deny convincingly its role in coups and guerrilla strikes all over the map. Americans just don't know whether to believe their own government or not. Many foreigners simply assume the United States is guilty.

STATINTL

STATINTL

CHARLESTON, W.VA.  
GAZETTE APR 21 1970  
M - 63,294  
GAZETTE-MAIL  
S - 106,775

## Editorials—

# Until There Is Reform, Kidnapings Will Increase

The world was justifiably outraged by the recent kidnaping and murder of Count Karl von Spreti, West German Ambassador, by Guatemalan guerrillas. But there is nothing new about such murders in Latin America, especially in Guatemala.

Guatemalan terrorists, of the far right as well as the far left, have murdered politicians, soldiers, journalists and even a beauty queen in recent years. In 1968 alone, three United States officials were slain, among them Ambassador John Gordon Mein. This year, leftist terrorists kidnaped the nation's foreign minister, Alberto Fuentes Mohr, and the United States labor attache, Sean M. Holly.

During the past year, political kidnapings have occurred in Guatemala, Colombia, Brazil, Argentina, the Dominican Republic and Uruguay, among other Latin American nations. Successful or attempted political kidnapings in the region have victimized officials of the United States, Paraguay, Guatemala, Uruguay, Japan, the Soviet Union and other nations.

What makes the murder of Count von Spreti all the more outrageous is that the Guatemalan government did nothing to prevent it. Even though it was well aware that terrorists were not inclined to bluffing, Guatemala decided to follow an example set earlier by Argentina and face down the kidnapers without meeting ransom demands.

The ambassador was kidnaped on March 31. At first the leftist guerrillas responsible for the kidnaping demanded the diplomat's exchange for 17 political prisoners. The Guatemalan government refused. Then, in Bonn, the West German government announced it "could not accept" Guatemala's decision. As the governments argued, the kidnapers increased their ransom to 25 prisoners plus \$700,000.

The full demands were made known on April 3. The West German government offered to pay the \$700,000 ransom on April 4. But the Guatemalan government continued to resist, despite a personal plea from the German chancellor, Willy

Brandt. Then, on April 5, a telephone call brought Guatemalan police to a shack 10 miles from the capital, where they found the body of the German diplomat, still warm, a bullet through his head.

Quite obviously, the Guatemalan government was all too willing to risk the life of a foreign diplomat, just to avoid the release of political prisoners who, if their only "crime" was political opposition, shouldn't have been in prison in the first place.

Regrettably, some are of the opinion that the kidnapings in a measure are due to CIA involvement with local "iron men" regimes. And there is little likelihood that the kidnapings will cease simply because the political "outs" consider the kidnapings of American officials or any other diplomats that may be handy as the one weapon available to them in obtaining the release of political compatriots.

What the United States should learn from what has been happening all too frequently in Guatemala and other South American countries is that dictatorships trying to keep in power by imprisoning political opponents do not deserve our support, either officially or through undercover activities of the CIA. The real need in those countries is for social and economic reform—and a free political system rather than one built upon imprisonment of political opponents—and until such reforms are achieved, the kidnapings are likely to increase rather than diminish.

GUARDIAN  
11 April 1970

# Guerrillas on the move in Latin America

By Alfredo Hopkins  
Special to the Guardian

Mexico City

The revolutionary movement in Latin America has consolidated itself after a number of setbacks in the 1960s and now appears headed for new victories in this decade.

The recent progress of the revolution in this hemisphere furthermore makes a complete lie out of the U.S. propaganda that the death of Comandante Ernesto "Che" Guevara in Bolivia meant the end of the armed liberation struggle in Latin America.

At this time, there is hardly a single geographical area south of the Rio Grande that doesn't have an armed guerrilla movement consolidated among the people or in the process of formation. Although the strategy and tactics vary from area to area, the goal is the same: the expulsion of imperialism, the overthrow of the native oligarchies and the development of revolutionary socialism.

In addition to the armed struggles going on since the early 1960s in Guatemala, Venezuela and Colombia, there are guerrilla groups operating in Nicaragua, Bolivia, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina and even Chile.

In Mexico a number of youths and the influential editor of "Por Que?" have been jailed on charges of bombing a number of public buildings and conspiring to form "guerrillas" to overthrow the government. The charges against Mario Menendez Rodrigues, the editor, are probably false but students associated with the 1968 student revolt contend there are several guerrilla groups forming in rural areas.

In Guatemala the Fuerzas Armadas Rebeides and the Movimiento Revolucionario 13 de Noviembre united forces after FAR broke with the reformist Guatemalan Communist party in 1968. Now it has reorganized its forces, developed its own ideology and tactics and—in the face of deteriorating economic conditions and ferocious repression—it is ready to face a probable showdown in the next few years that may lead it to victory.

## Election advances situation

Ironically the situation has been advanced by the election March 1st of Colonel Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio, a collaborator of the late dictator Castillo Armas who was put into power in the 1954 CIA-United Fruit Company invasion and coup that ousted the progressive regime of President Jacobo Arbenz. Arana is said to have been one of the forces behind the creation of paramilitary fascist-type organizations during the present regime of Julio Cesar Menendez Montenegro and claims to have "exterminated" the guerrillas in Zacapa, his military zone. (Some observers say many more innocent peasants than revolutionaries were killed in the operation.)

Furthermore Arana came to power in an election in which more than 50 percent of the registered voters abstained—that is, with a mere 42 percent of the 540,589 votes cast. Some 50,000

FAR victory within four years.

## Border war diverts pressure

The border war between Honduras and El Salvador has taken some of the pressure off critical internal problems in both countries for the moment. But it is significant that in 1967 numerous militants left the reformist Communist party to form a new group dedicated to the need to initiate an armed struggle for national liberation.

In Nicaragua the Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional has consolidated in the countryside after a few years of operation, carrying its message to the peasants and engaging in occasional battles with the Somoza dictatorship's armed forces. Last year it was attacked by the combined forces of Somoza and the Costa Rican national police. Its survival is the assurance of its popularity. The FSL bases its program on anti-Somozaism rather than anti-imperialism, in as much as the people see Somoza as the main enemy.

In January of 1970 the press revealed that three "guerrillas" had been arrested in Panama and despite the rigorous press censorship imposed by the military regime that came to power in the wake of Rockefeller's visit. There have been persistent rumors of guerrilla operations, some of which are believed to be associated with deposed president Arufo Arias. The proximity to the U.S. Canal Zone colony and numerous U.S. anti-guerrilla warfare centers makes the struggle in Panama of particular importance.

In Colombia a Catholic priest recently joined the Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, thus filling the place of the late Father Camilo Torres. To the northwest the Ejercito Popular de Liberacion has been organizing peasants into co-operatives, protected by the usually invisible guns of a growing peasant army that recently claimed to have shot down an army helicopter, as in Vietnam.

The oldest Colombian group, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas, located to the south of Bogota, completes the

encirclement of the capital by rebels. Although FARC has gone through a period of decadence due to attempts by the revisionist Communist party to disengage it from the struggle (in favor of the "peaceful road to power" by elections), it remains entrenched among the peasants in the area.

For its part the Colombian Catholic church is undergoing a virtual internal civil war, with the Galcondia group openly advocating socialism and the hierarchy continuing to side with the oligarchy. On the eve of presidential elections in which the Liberal-Conservative oligarchical alliance is being seriously threatened by the demagogical campaign of ex-dictator Rojas Penilla, the government has ordered a month-long closing of virtually all of the country's universities.

In Venezuela the "pacification" program of Christian Democrat Rafael Caldera has turned out to be a complete failure and the two guerrilla movements are determined to continue the struggle, despite the repeated stories that they have been "liquidated"

STATINTL

Continued

GAINESVILLE, FLA.  
SUN

E - 21,088  
S - 22,112

MAR 24 1970

## Cuba and Guatemala

No two situations are ever quite alike, so the "lessons of history" are tricky. But there is a certain parallel between U.S. actions in Guatemala and Cuba. The United States tried to overthrow the Communist-led governments in both places by an invasion of exiles bankrolled by the United States Central Intelligence Agency. The effort succeeded in Guatemala in 1954 and it failed in Cuba in 1969.

Cuba is more Communist than it was in 1961, heavily subsidized by Russia and its Communist allies. It got away with confiscating a billion dollars' worth of private property of Americans. Yet already it has largely lost elsewhere in Latin America. It is no longer regarded as much of a danger, by Latin American governments or by Washington.

Guatemala has had a bumpy history since 1954: very little economic or social progress, recurring violence, free elections which do not seem to settle much. The Communist guerrillas were supposedly wiped out in savage fighting in the mountains in

1966-68 (and several times earlier).

But they still exist as an urban underground, strong enough to kidnap the Guatemalan foreign minister, the United States labor attache, and a prominent Guatemalan banker in the last few weeks.

In 1968 they killed two U.S. military attaches in January and the U.S. ambassador in August, right in the capital.

In Cuba the United States has no diplomats, but in Communist countries where it does have, the worst that happens to them is an occasional "spontaneous demonstration" with broken windows.

Is the fragmented "world Communist movement" ahead by having a costly weak sister like Castro's Cuba? Is the fragmented "free world" ahead because the United States once "saved from communism" a backward weak sister like Guatemala? It's hard to tell, but a reasonable hypothesis is that Cuba is a net drain on world communism and Guatemala is far from an asset to the U.S.

STATINTL  
ST. LOUIS, MO.  
POST-DISPATCH

E - 345,675

S - ~~441~~ 591 1970  
~~MARK~~*Survival in Guatemala*

How to succeed in the Guatemalan presidency requires not really trying to impose many needed reforms. Before he took power after an election in 1966, President Julio Mendez Montenegro had to assure the outgoing military dictatorship there would be no great economic or social changes. The Mendez regime has been liberal enough in Guatemalan terms, but its main achievement has been to survive.

So today Guatemala — or those eligible to vote — will choose a new president, whose main problem also will be political survival. Only two freely-elected presidents have served out their terms in recent history. There are three candidates for today, but Mario Puentes Picucchi, the present finance minister, is expected to defeat a right-wing colonel and a Christian Democrat.

Survival is no doubt the first requisite for any government in a country immediately threatened by both right and left-wing terrorism, but the long range threat is something else again. Roughly 2 per cent of the people own 72 per cent of the land; half the country's population lives outside the real money economy. In 1954 the Arbenz government expropriated one million acres of land, including United Fruit Co. property — but that government was overthrown as allegedly Communist by a CIA-sponsored coup.

Since then the United States has provided more than \$200,000,000 in economic aid to its protégé, and those funds have hardly made a dent in the shroud of the misery. So the question that might be asked about Guatemalan governments and the United States policy supporting them is simply this: Is survival really enough?

E - 35,273

FEB 28 1970

## Editorial

# Guatemala & Democracy

Troubled Guatemala stands at the crossroads. Presidential elections scheduled for Sunday will determine whether the Central American nation will continue a four-year-old experiment in constitutional government or revert to military rule. Even the lack of a clear-cut electoral decision could reopen old political wounds and launch a wave of violence.

Terrorists of the extreme right and the extreme left have tried to upset the election and force a coup—the rightists to restore “law and order” and the leftists to unite the people against the military. So far, the government of President Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro has been able to keep relative order.

Three candidates are running for the presidency. They are Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, the present finance minister and candidate of the governing Revolutionary Party; Col. Carlos Arana Osorio, standard bearer of the right-wing National Liberation movement, and Jorge Caballeros Mazariego, a Christian Democrat. Most political observers say Fuentes Pieruccini should win — barring a fresh outbreak of terrorism.

Mendez's outstanding achievement has been to survive despite the heavy pressure on him from the right and left. If he hands over the sash of office to a freely-elected successor on July 1, he will be only the second Guatemalan president in recent history to do so. Survival has been achieved at a stiff price. Before taking over in 1966, the liberal regime had to promise the outgoing military dictatorship there would be no startling reforms.

Given the situation in Guatemala — 2 per cent of the population owns 72 per cent of the land — agrarian reform should be a key issue. Little has been done in this field. The government has before it the example of what happened to President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman. In 1954, his leftist regime expropriated 1.2 million acres of

land. Much of it was idle United Fruit Company property.

When a shipment of Czech arms was sent to Guatemala, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles told a press conference on May 25, 1954: “By this arms shipment, a government in which Communist influence is very strong has come into a position to dominate militarily the Central American area.” The threat was ended three weeks later when Col. Carlos Castillo Armas led a Central Intelligence Agency-sponsored invasion of Guatemala that sent Arbenz into exile.

Since then, sizeable amounts of United States aid have been channeled to a succession of basically conservative regimes. During the years of the Alliance for Progress, from 1961 to 1969, Guatemala received about \$207 million in U.S. economic assistance. But nearly half the country's five million people remain outside the economy. Urban and rural slums proliferate.

Because of its association with past governments, U.S. personnel and installations have often been the objects of attack from leftists and terrorists. On Jan. 17, 1968, two members of the military mission were machine-gunned to death. Eight months later, John Gordon Mein, the ambassador, was killed during an apparent kidnap attempt.

Washington's interest in Guatemalan stability is still strong. The Richard Alfred Latin American Service reports that the U.S. is spending \$400,000 this year to train and organize the nation's police. “If the police can keep the lid on through the election, a good part of the credit must go” to this little-known program, the service stated.

The election has an importance that transcends the frontiers of the Tennessee-sized country. Guatemala has taken a tentative step toward representative government at a time when much of Latin America is relapsing into military rule.

REGISTER

FEB 19 1970

M - 246,041

S - 514,496

# Law and Order Election Issue In Guatemala

By Richard Alfred

GUATEMALA CITY, GUATEMALA —

On Mar. 1, more than half a million Guatemalans will vote for a new president and congress, to take office on July 1 for the next four years. The principal issue — reminiscent of campaigns in the United States — is law and order.

Three major parties in this Tennessee-sized Central American republic are vying against a background of persistent urban terrorism. Fire bombings of business establishments fill the front pages of newspapers here. Three thousand policemen, armed with carbines, patrol the city day and night. The head of the country's intelligence service was machinegunned to death in his car the other day on a downtown street.

Guatemalan authorities agree that the purpose of the terrorism is to shake the confidence of the public in the ability of



PRESIDENT MENDEZ

Richard Alfred is the pseudonym of Nathan Haverstock and Richard Schroeder, experienced observers of the Latin American scene.

the government to preserve order, and possibly to forestall elections by fomenting a military coup. But there is no clear agreement on who is behind the terrorism. In Guatemala, there are terrorist bands of both the extreme left and extreme right, and both are active.

## Completed A Full Term

The present government is in the hands of the Revolutionary Party, led by President Mario Mendez Montenegro. Contrary to its name, the party is centrist and moderate. Its chief accomplishment has been to remain in power for four years, something no elected government has done since 1951.

The candidate of the government party is Mario Fuentes Pieruccini, a somewhat lackluster party regular. Since his party controls the machinery of the bu-

reaucracy and can use it to reach remote villages — no small advantages in this mountainous land — Pieruccini is given a slight edge. Like the Revolutionary Party, Pieruccini was once classed as a moderate leftist, but in recent years he has grown more conservative. As nearly as can be determined, his candidacy is considered "safe" by officials of the U.S. embassy and representatives of U.S. firms with interests in the country.

The big "if" in Pieruccini's campaign is the ability of the government to curb the terrorists. If the violence continues unabated, the electorate may well turn away from the Revolutionary Party, but if the government can clamp the lid down, Pieruccini should be all but unbeatable.

## Support for Rightist

With this in mind, the terrorists have stepped up their pace. The renewed terrorism seems to be having the desired effect. Observers have noted an upsurge of support for Col. Carlos Arana Osorio, the candidate of a rightist coalition between the Movement of National Liberation and the Institutional Democratic Party. In 1964, the two parties ran separate candidates, but their total vote was greater than that of the Revolutionary Party by some 20 per cent.

Arana, a vehement anti-Communist, is the spiritual heir of Col. Carlos Castillo Armas, who overthrew left-leaning Jacobo Arbenz in 1954, reportedly with the help of the CIA. Castillo Armas was himself assassinated three years later. Arana has earned a reputation as a tough anti-guerrilla fighter, the military commander who stamped out terrorism in the northeast coastal area around Puerto Barrios. Conservative businessmen look to him to do the same in the capital.

The third candidate is Lucas Caballeros of the Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party. This party was established in 1955 by conservative Catholic laymen, but it has undergone progressive liberalization since then. With the church divided into rival reformist and conservative factions, Caballeros can count on little Catholic support, and is not given much chance.

## Watched Closely

The elections are being watched closely by the diplomatic community here. A Pieruccini victory would mean continuing close ties with the United States, and renewed Guatemalan leadership in the beleaguered Central American Common Market.

An upset victory by Arana would almost certainly mean a swing to the right, and a period of tight internal security as the military moved against subversives in the city and the countryside. It could also mean retrenchment in the country's foreign relations and a pulling back from the Common Market.

## Davis's Predecessor Slain

# Envoy Finds Terror Easing in Guatemala

By Lewis H. Diuguid  
Washington Post Staff Writer

GUATEMALA CITY—"I like to climb mountains, so I've been up some of these volcanoes," said U.S. Ambassador Nathaniel Davis. "My pistoleros just go along up the volcano, too. They enjoy it."

Armed guards have accompanied Davis since his arrival in Guatemala in November, 1968. Three months before, his predecessor, John Gordon Mein, was shot dead by terrorists when he fled from an apparent kidnapping attempt.

Although earlier in 1968 two officers of the U.S. Military Mission were machine-gunned to death, Mein had made a point of keeping public contacts normal.

By orders from Washington, casual ambassadorial meanderings ended with Mein's death. At the embassy, Marines not only guard the entrances but survey the building by closed-circuit television. The staff is drilled on self-protection procedures.

But Davis insists that "life is more normal than the existence of police protection would indicate." Americans living here draw the same conclusion. They say Mein's policy—open and forthcoming contacts with Guatemalans who desire them—has continued under Davis.

According to Davis, there has been no deliberately violent act against any of about 200 Americans working for the U.S. government here since Mein's death.

Which is not to say that all is calm. The wife of one official was driving by an army post when a guard put a rifle butt through the car's windshield. Both sides agreed it was a mistake.

"But we haven't lost a



NATHANIEL DAVIS

... enjoys mountain climbing tourist yet," said Davis. He, like thousands of American tourists finds Guatemala fascinating. He is anxious to point out that terrorism is rare and diminishing.

Despite the encumbrance of his pistoleros, Davis actually has carried Mein's policy of closeness with the Guatemalan people a step further, with mixed reviews from the resident Americans.

Davis, 44, is a career diplomat and onetime Peace Corps official. A Presbyterian, he has joined the Central Church attended by Guatemalans, rather than the foreign, largely American, congregation.

The wife of a U.S. diplomat in that congregation was heard to say recently, "well, I guess he had a little too much Peace Corps before he came here."

The Davis's fourth child was born in Guatemala City and baptised at the church. An American missionary, Robert Thorp, was called in to perform the ceremony as Guatemala's 15,000 Presbyterians, unique in the

church, do not customarily practice baptism.

Thorp describes Davis this way: "He is a wise man, and this may be one of the reasons he related himself with the Spanish congregation rather than the English."

The baptism ceremony went off without incident, with the Davis bodyguards seated in a back pew.

While acts of terrorism against Americans have come from the extreme left, Guatemala has also suffered counter-terror from the right. Both types have fallen off, although with the country in an election campaign there was scattered resurgence.

Leftist guerrillas once controlled parts of the countryside, but they are beset and divided. Most survivors moved to the city. Urban terror went up accordingly. A U.S. aid program is directed toward improving performance of the police force, and four U.S. policemen are here as advisors.

Political terrorism in this Tennessee-sized country was accentuated in polarization that followed the overthrow, in 1954, of a left-wing government by CIA-backed rightists.

Since then, U.S. policy has been aimed at redressing that act by strict observance of neutrality, non-interference in internal politics, and cooperation by invitation only. One mark of Davis's success is the fact that charges of U. S. favoritism toward a candidate—common in Latin American elections—have not been heard in the Guatemalan campaign.

"I'm having a great time. I like the country and the job," he said. "The whole world is an uncertain peace."

Latin America is particularly uncertain these days, for American diplomats. Since the ambassador to Brazil was kidnaped last year, stricter security has become the rule throughout the hemisphere.

Mrs. Gordon Mein now lives in Washington. Among the people with whom she exchanges letters is Cardinal Casariego, archbishop of Guatemala. He was a close friend of her husband. Earlier in 1968 the archbishop was also kidnaped by rightist terrorists.

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# Air America: Flying the U.S. into Laos

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had begun in Laos in 1959; moreover, it appears that President Eisenhower was not informed and did not know when his office and authority were being committed in the Laotian conflict, just as Nixon did not know of the intrigue of Mme. Chennault. But that is precisely the point of parapolitics and private war enterprise.

In its evasion of Congressional and even Executive controls over military commitments in Laos and elsewhere, the CIA has long relied on the services of General Chennault's "private" paramilitary arm, Civil Air Transport or (as it is now known) Air America, Inc. ✓

## [HOW AIR AMERICA WAGES WAR]

AIR AMERICA'S FLEETS OF TRANSPORT planes are readily seen in the airports of Laos, South Viet-Nam, Thailand and Taiwan. The company is based in Taiwan, where a subsidiary firm, Air Asia, with some 8000 employees, runs one of the world's largest aircraft maintenance and repair facilities. While not all of Air America's operations are paramilitary or even covert, in Viet-Nam and even more in Laos, it is the chief airline serving the CIA in its clandestine war activities. ✓

IN THE CLOSING DAYS OF THE 1968 presidential campaign, the Democrats made an eleventh-hour bid for the presidency through a White House announcement that all bombing in North Viet-Nam was being stopped and that serious peace negotiations were about to begin. This move was apparently torpedoed within 30 hours by President Thieu of South Viet-Nam who publicly rejected the coming negotiations. Three days later, the Democratic candidate lost to Richard Nixon by a narrow margin.

After the election, it was revealed that a major Nixon fund raiser and supporter had engaged in elaborate machinations in Saigon (including false assurances that Nixon would not enter into such negotiations if elected) to sabotage the Democrats' plan. It was also revealed that, through wire taps, the White House and Humphrey knew of these maneuvers before the election and that a heated debate had gone on among Humphrey strategists as to whether the candidate should exploit the discovery in the last moments of the campaign. Humphrey declined to seize the opportunity, he said, because he was sure that Nixon was unaware of and did not approve of the activities of his supporter in Saigon.

The supporter in question was Madame Anna Chennault, and her covert intervention into the highest affairs of state was by no means an unprecedented act for her and her associates. Madame Chennault's husband, General Claire Chennault, had fought in China with Chiang Kai-shek; after the war he formed a private airline company. Both husband and wife have, through their involvement with the China Lobby and the CIA's complex of private corporations, played a profound role throughout our involvement in Southeast Asia. General Chennault's airline was, for example, employed by the U.S. government in 1954 to fly in support for the French at Dien Bien Phu. It was also a key factor in the new fighting which

Until recently the largest of these operations was the supply of the fortified hilltop positions of the 45,000 Meo tribesmen fighting against the Pathet Lao behind their lines in northeast Laos. Most of these Meo outposts have airstrips that will accommodate special Short Take-off And Landing aircraft, but because of the danger of enemy fire the American and Nationalist Chinese crews have usually relied on parachute drops of guns, mortars, ammunition, rice, even live chickens and pigs. Air America's planes also serve to transport the Meos' main cash crop, opium.

The Meo units, originally organized and trained by the French, have provided a good indigenous army for the Americans in Laos. Together with their CIA and U.S. Special Forces "advisors," the Meos have long been used to harass Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese supply lines. More recently they have engaged in conventional battles in which they have been transported by Air America's planes and helicopters (New York Times, October 29, 1969). The Meos also defended, until its capture in 1968, the key U.S. radar installation at Pathi near the North Vietnamese border; the station had been used in the bombing of North Viet-Nam.

Further south in Laos, Air America flies out of the CIA operations headquarters at Pakse, from which it reportedly supplies an isolated U.S. Army camp at Attapu in the south-east, as well as the U.S. and South Vietnamese Special Forces operations in the same region (San Francisco Chronicle, October 15, 1969). Originally the chief purpose of these activities was to observe and harass the Ho Chi Minh trail, but recently the fighting in the Laotian panhandle, as elsewhere in the country, has expanded into a general air and ground war. Air America planes are reported to be flying arms, supplies and reinforcements in this larger campaign as well (New York

by Peter Dale Scott

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